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Abstract
This article combines a discrete choice model of demand for residential local telephone 
access and an optimal price regulation model to estimate the welfare weights that state 
regulators place on consumers with different incomes and locations. I  fi nd no evidence of a 
bias towards rural consumers on average, but the relative weight on low income consumers 
in a geographic area can vary as a function of the proportions of rural and poor population 
and the political characteristics of the regulator. I also measure the welfare consequences 
of deviating from total consumer surplus maximization and disconnecting prices from costs.
Keywords: Ramsey prices, regulatory bias, welfare analysis, telecommunications, GMM.
JEL classifi cation: L51, L96, D61.
Resumen
Este artículo combina un modelo de elección discreta para la demanda de acceso residencial 
a la red telefónica local y un modelo de regulación óptima de precios para estimar los pesos 
que los reguladores estatales asocian al bienestar de consumidores con distintos niveles de 
renta y localización geográfi ca. En media, no se encuentra evidencia de un sesgo a favor de 
los consumidores rurales, pero sí de que el peso asociado al bienestar de los consumidores 
de renta baja puede variar como una función de las proporciones de población rural y 
en situación de pobreza, así como de las características políticas del regulador. También 
mido las consecuencias en el bienestar social de la desviación con respecto al criterio de 
maximización del bienestar de los consumidores y de desconectar precios y costes.
Palabras claves: Precios de Ramsey, sesgo regulatorio, análisis del bienestar económico, 
telecomunicaciones, método generalizado de los momentos.
Códigos JEL: L51, L96, D61.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 5 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1201
1 Introduction
Residential access to the telephone network is a local service for which demand and cost condi-
tions differ across the geography and the different social groups of the United States. Optimal
prices, which maximize total welfare given the constraints on the regulator, would vary as a
function of these different market conditions, but the bias of regulators in favor of particular
consumer groups can introduce additional price dispersion. This article estimates the relative
welfare weights that state regulators place on the surplus of consumers with different incomes
and geographic locations and obtains a measure of the welfare effects of bias towards different
consumer groups.
A state telephone regulator in the United States has jurisdiction over multiple local markets
and, in principle, it could set a different price for each local market and consumer group. In
practice, the pricing policies of state regulators are homogenous across large areas of their
jurisdictions. In addition, non-geographic price discrimination is limited to discounted prices
for low income consumers. I use an optimal regulation model to rationalize these observed
pricing decisions and allow for a regulator’s objective function that is a weighted sum of the
profits of the firm and consumer surplus. This formal model can accommodate both the cases
of a welfare maximizing regulator that acts in the public interest, and a regulator guided by
private interest that places different weights across members of its jurisdiction.
Cross subsidies across telecommunications consumers (business to residential, urban to rural,
high-income to low-income) have concerned both academics and practitioners.1 This concern
originates from the impact of cross subsidies on profits, and their potential to decrease social
welfare by disconnecting prices and costs. A particular form of cross subsidy that lacks rigorous
analysis is the possible transfer between urban and rural customers, as pointed out in Riordan
(2002). Observation of tariffs for different geographic areas as in Riordan (2002) or Rosston and
Wimmer (2005) reveals that telephone rates for rural areas are on average below average cost
1The term cross subsidy generally refers to price distortions originated by allowing losses for a subset of
services A sustained by positive profits in subset B. Faulhaber (1975) provides a formal definition characterizing
a price structure as subsidy-free if revenues do not exceed stand-alone costs for any subset of services. Palmer
(1992) finds positive evidence of a subsidy from business to residential telephone users.
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and lower than in corresponding urban areas. This observation alone is not enough to conclude
that there is a different weight on urban and rural consumers as demand and marginal costs
also differ across these areas. For example, the higher cost of service in a rural area is not
incorporated fully in the optimal price if demand for telephone service is weaker than in urban
areas. The formal regulation model and GMM estimation methods allow me to separate demand
and cost factors from regulatory bias.
I estimate the demand for telephone access with a discrete choice model applied to a broad
cross section of local market data in the US. I combine simulation techniques and the empirical
income distribution in the Census of the United States to control for household heterogeneity
in income and participation in welfare programs. Income affects the price sensitivity of a house-
hold, but also the actual price schedule of the household through the presence of low income
subsidies. The estimated average demand elasticity is low, although low income households,
who are potential marginal adopters, exhibit significantly higher average elasticity.
The relative welfare weights of consumers are estimated under different assumptions on the
cost of service. Engineering cost data from the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
is used to estimate the average and marginal costs per line used in the welfare maximization
problem of the regulator. I also consider different assumptions on the fraction of the cost of
subsidy programs that is internalized by state regulators. The federal government funds part
of the price subsidies to low income customers and high cost areas. If the federal portion of
the cost of price subsidies is not internalized by a state regulator, it might reduce prices for the
subsidized consumers even if it does not put a high weight on their welfare.
I find some evidence in favor of the existence of differences in welfare weights across con-
sumers, and that these differences are connected to the percentage of rural and poor population
in an area. For the different specifications, a higher percentage of rural population in a geo-
graphic area is seen to increase the weight in favor of the low income consumers in that area.
On the contrary, the estimated weights on consumers that are not low income do not increase
significantly in rural areas.
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the cost of federal funding is internalized by state regulators, I find a high relative weight on
low income consumers in geographic areas with a high percentage of poor population. This
result is reversed if I assume that the costs of federal subsidy programs are not internalized
by state regulators. The exclusion of the federal portion reduces significantly the cost of low
income subsidies. Under this assumption, the fact that state regulators are not allowing a higher
level of subsidies implies then a low weight on the welfare of low income consumers. Political
controls also turn significant in this latter specification, with the percentage of democrats in
the regulatory body and direct election associated to higher weights on low income consumers.
Counterfactual experiments examine first the alignment of prices with estimated marginal
and average costs. Actual residential telephone prices are generally below marginal line costs,
and the resulting deficit is covered by the profits of the firm in other sectors and regulatory
subsidies. The change from actual to cost oriented prices leads to a substantial transfer from
consumers to firms ($8.5bn annually for marginal cost pricing). However, the adjustment in
total welfare is moderate ($192m annually for marginal cost pricing). Unless indirect efficiency
gains are sizeable, the reduction in consumer surplus from the shift to cost oriented prices well
exceeds the increase in total welfare.
I also study the shift to prices maximizing unweighted consumer surplus given a constant
deficit. This policy eliminates the bias across consumers and it produces a transfer from low
income consumers to the general population. Finally, I examine prices maximizing total welfare
with the constraint of recovering the total cost of residential telephone service. The results of
this experiment are close to the cost oriented pricing rules with reductions in low income tele-
phone penetration, substantial redistribution from consumers to firms and moderate increases
in total welfare. The welfare gains in this set of experiments increase only moderately if full
price discrimination across local markets is allowed. This provides some support for the broad
geographic price zones used by state regulators.
The demand for telephone access across the United States has been studied with aggregate
data in a number of works including Taylor and Kreidel (1990), Hausman et al. (1993), Crandall
and Waverman (2000), Ross et al. (1998), Garbacz and Thompson (2002) and Ackerberg et
The effect of the percentage of poor population depends on the specification considered. If
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al. (2008). An important motivation of these studies is measuring the elasticity of demand for
local telephone access to prices in order to evaluate the effect of federal and state subsidies.
Hausman et al. (1993) use Federal Communications Commission (FCC) data on penetration
aggregated over multiple local markets and conclude that there is a low elasticity of access to
price. Ross et al. (1998) and Garbacz and Thompson (2002) find similar results with the use
of state-wide data. For example, Garbacz and Thompson (2002) find own price elasticity in
the range of -0.006 and -0.011, a value close to the -0.005 in Hausman et al. (1993). The use
of aggregated data masks variation in local conditions and the aggregation of all consumers
masks the possible differences in demand elasticity of different demographic groups. Ackerberg
et al. (2008) address these shortcomings with a sample at the local market level focused on
poor households, who are more likely to have an homogenous price elasticity. Ackerberg et al.
(2008) also control for the endogeneity of prices and subsidies. The current article contributes
to this literature considering how to control with aggregate data and simulation methods for
the differences in marginal utility of income across demographic groups and introducing an
explicit optimal regulation model for the endogenous choice of prices.2
The use of discrete choice models with simulation to study markets for differentiated goods
and heterogenous consumers has become popular in the empirical IO literature following the
work of Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995), BLP henceforth. This estimation framework is well
known, with clear asymptotic properties of the estimator set in Berry, Linton and Pakes (2004).
Applications are numerous, including examples such as Nevo (2000, 2001) and Ho (2006).
A related strand of the literature studies demand for telephone services with micro data in
articles such as Perl (1984), Train et al. (1987), Miravete (2002), Wolak (1996), and Economides
et al. (2008). This micro data allows to control directly for the effect of individual income and
demographic characteristics. Additionally, the observation of individual usage and choices over
price menus allows one to estimate not only the demand for access but also for the number of
2The pioneering study by Taylor and Kreidel (1990) considered the aggregation of individual demand func-
tions for telephone access according to the distribution of income. Taylor (1994) Chapter 5.II reproduces this
work. The estimator used in this study does not allow to derive standard errors for the price coefficients, see p.
103 of Taylor (1994).
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calls, duration and service plans. These articles find a low average elasticity of local usage to
the price per call and that households make a stable number of local calls per month. These
findings provide some justification for the use of the minimum cost of a fixed number of monthly
calls as a proxy for the cost of local telephone service in the studies with aggregate data.
The study of telecommunications regulation includes examples such as Ai and Sappington
(2002), Ai, Martinez and Sappington (2004), Donald and Sappington (1995) and Greenstein,
McMaster and Spiller (1995), Rosston and Wimmer (2005) and Rosston et al. (2008). These
empirical studies estimate the effect of different economic and political characteristics of the
state on the choices of regulators (price and quality levels, incentive plans, etc.) and the firm
(investment, etc.). This literature connects with the early work of Joskow (1972, 1973) that
studies the interaction between regulatory process and policy for regulated utilities. The present
work is closest to Rosston et al. (2008) as that article studies the effect of private interest groups
on the structure of telephone prices (retail, business and wholesale) by estimating a system of
price equations that controls for demand, cost and political factors. The current article is
focused on residential prices and it contributes to this literature with a structural approach
that recovers information on the objective function of the regulator and welfare variations.
Related structural studies of regulation include Wolak (1994), Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002)
and Timmins (2002). Wolak (1994) estimates the production function of regulated water util-
ities and tests for the presence of private cost information. Gagnepain and Ivaldi (2002) also
focus on the estimation of the production function and private information of the firm.3 Gag-
nepain and Ivaldi (2002) do not use the assumption of an optimizing regulator for estimation
but they use the optimal regulation model to calculate counterfactual welfare levels of alter-
native regulation regimes. Timmins (2002) recovers the forward-looking costs of water supply
in California and he uses a regulator’s welfare function with weight differences only between
consumers and the firm. I allow the weights on different consumer groups to vary as a function
of their demographic and political characteristics.
3Seminal models of industrial regulation with asymmetric information include Baron and Myerson (1982)
and Laffont and Tirole (1986). See Vuong and Perrigne (2004) estimation methodology for Laffont and Tirole
(1986).
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The use of an optimal regulation model to separate welfare weights can be traced back to
Ross (1984). This article spanned a series of empirical applications such as Morrison (1987),
Kim (1995) and Knittel (2003). I contribute to this literature with the joint GMM estimation
of the demand and the structural regulation models.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 provides basic background on the
local telephone sector. Section 3 provides a description of the data set. Section 4 presents the
demand and regulation models. Section 5 builds the estimation procedure. Section 6 presents
results. Section 7 introduces policy experiments. Section 8 concludes.
2 Local Telephone Network in the US
A local telephone network combines a wire center (or switching office) and connection facilities
(lines), which are operated by a local carrier firm. Gasmi et al. (2002) provide a detailed
technical description of local telephone networks. Local telephone markets in the United States
have been typically served by a single firm denominated as local exchange carrier (LEC) and
subject to price and quality regulation. A single firm, AT&T, dominated the majority of local
markets and the long distance segment for most of the past century.
The presence of fixed cost elements in the local network can create returns of scale and scope
that make the duplication of the infrastructure socially undesirable.4 Price regulation is then
justified as a mean to sustain adequate investment in infrastructure and, at the same time, limit
the exercise of monopoly power. A regulator could also be more capable of ensuring generalized
access to the Telecommunication network, a goal that can be termed as Universal Service.
Alternatively, a market solution can provide better incentives for allocative (lower demand
distortions) and dynamic (investment) efficiency. The FCC, courts and legislators progressively
moved from the regulatory to the market paradigm over the second half of the last century. The
regulatory reform process culminated into the Telecommunications Act of 1996. Brock (2002),
4To test for the presence of returns to scale and scope, Evans and Heckman (1983) and Shin and Ying (1992)
use historical AT&T data, whereas Gabel and Kennet (1994) and Gasmi, Laffont and Sharkey (1997) use data
from engineering cost simulations and find stronger evidence in favor of returns of scale and scope than the
earlier articles.
Hausman (2002) and Woroch (2002) provide a complete historical overview.
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The Telecommunications Act of 1996, TA of 1996 henceforth, aimed to provide a legal
framework that facilitated competition in all the segments of the industry. New competitive
local exchange carriers (CLECs) would enter local telephone markets and compete with the
incumbent local carriers (ILECs). The TA of 1996 did not however eliminate the regulatory
powers of the states and the FCC. The power of state regulators over tariffs is backed by the
US Supreme Court jurisprudence.5 State regulators maintained their authority over local retail
prices and they were assigned the task to mediate between ILECs and CLECs in the pricing of
wholesale access. The FCC initially favored a forward looking cost methodology to determine
wholesale prices, but litigation by the ILECs lead to the adoption of the Review Remand Order
(2004) with an upward revision of access prices.
Data fromKaserman andMayo (2002) andWoroch (2002) reveals that, in year 2000, the vast
majority of the local network (approximately 94% of total local area revenues totalling $111.8bn
at 1999 year end) was operated by incumbent local companies, either independent or part of
Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs) with presence in several states. Additionally,
CLECs focus on business users and have a small presence in the residential sector. Economides
et al. (2008) also reveal that the entry of competition in local residential telephony does not
lead to big changes in the average price level. The preferred formal process of regulation of
state tariffs in year 2000 was price cap, as documented in Ai and Sappington (2002). Price caps
below the monopoly price will be a binding constraint for regulated ILECs that face moderate
competition.
The TA of 1996 also created explicit universal service subsidies targeted to schools, rural
health providers, low income users and high cost areas.6 State regulators influence the imple-
mentation of universal service subsidies through the designation of eligible carriers to different
5Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas (Hope) in 320 U.S. 591 (1944) and Bluefield Water Works
& Improvement Co. v. Public Service Commission of West Virginia in 262 U.S. 679 (1923). Gifford (2003)
provides a brief overview of the legal framework.
6The Universal Service Administrative Company (USAC) is an agency created by the FCC to administer
the Universal Service Fund. From 1998 to 2008, the Fund has disbursed approximately $ 57.7bn in different
programs. See http://www.usac.org/default.aspx for a detailed breakdown.
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programs, and choice of price subsidies to low income users. There are currently two programs
that reduce the cost of telephone access to low income users: the Lifeline program, which re-
duces monthly charges, and the Linkup program, which reduces connection charges. I describe
these programs in more detail below.
Current policy debate is concerned with the further regulation of the Internet and improve-
ment of Universal Service with a possible extension of subsidies to Broadband Internet. The
Communications Opportunity, Promotion and Enhancement (COPE) Act of 2006 contains spe-
cific developments in this area. The experience in the regulation of the local telephone network
can provide a guideline for the extension of Internet regulation.
3 Data Set
Data on local market characteristics (race groups, income distribution, network size, etc.), state
regulators (tariffs, political composition, election rule, etc.) and the costs of the firm are drawn
from the United States Census (2000) and reports of the FCC and state regulators. I obtained
most of this information from the data set in Ackerberg et al. (2008).7 The data set covers
7,118 wire center locations in 43 states and the District of Columbia for the original RBOC
regions in the year 2000.
I use the wire center as definition of local market based on the geographic proximity of the
households and the homogenous cost of service inside these areas. The variation in demand
and operational conditions across wire centers contains information that might be masked at
the state level, e. g., dispersion in penetration levels across the state.
The United States Census (2000) is the source of demand information and it allows me to
construct the percentage of total households in a wire center with telephone service, Tel Pen
Total. The definitions of local market demographic variables are relegated to the Appendix A.
Panel (a) of Table 1 provides summary statistics for these demographic variables. Sections 3.1
and 3.2 describe the price and cost data.
7I indicate clearly below the additional information that I add to the original data set in Ackerberg et al.
(2008).
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3.1 Prices and Low-Income Discounts
The information on regulated tariffs in year 2000 was collected directly from the public utility
commissions for Ackerberg et al. (2008). The local telephone service is charged according
to usage-based, flat or hybrid rate plans. This raw tariff data was used to construct the
minimum expense of completing different numbers of local calls per month: no calls (the utility
of the telephone line is limited to completing emergency calls), 50, 100 and 200 calls. The
different proxies for the cost of telephone access are then labeled: Monthly_0, Monthly_50,
Monthly_100 andMonthly_200. The differences between these price variables are moderated
through the presence of flat rate components in the different tariff plans. The use of price
proxies is imposed by the absence of detailed usage data, but it is reasonable given that previous
literature found that local calls are not sensitive to usage prices and the prevalence of flat tariffs.
I will focus on Monthly_50, a price proxy consistent with moderate use of the service that
is also employed in Ackerberg et al. (2008). The initial installation charge, Connection, is
included as an additional price control.
Low income consumers can access lower rates through participation in the Lifeline and
Linkup programs. The Lifeline program subsidizes the monthly cost of telephone service and
the Linkup program reduces the initial connection charge. The basic levels of both programs
are covered with federal funds, but state regulators are free to set additional subsidies. In the
case of the Lifeline program, additional federal contributions will match every dollar of state
subsidies with 50 cents up to a discount cap. The corresponding proxies for subsidized prices
are listed asMonthly_0(sub),Monthly_50(sub),Monthly_100(sub),Monthly_200(sub) and
Connection(sub). Additional details on the political profile of regulators, competition and the
price setting process are relegated to the Appendix A. Panel (b) of Table 1 provides summary
statistics of state public utility commissions (PUCs), competition and prices.
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3.2 Cost and Quality Characteristics
The cost data is drawn from the Hybrid Cost Proxy Model (HCPM) used by the FCC to
determine which wire centers are above the national average cost of service. The FCC Ninth
Report and Order (1999) set subsidies for non rural ILECs in states with average costs above the
HCPM national cost benchmark. This FCC Order also set transitional hold-harmless subsidies
for non rural ILECs that did not qualify under the HCPM criteria but received subsidies under
preexisting programs. All companies in the sample qualify as non rural.
I form with the HCPM data estimates of average and marginal cost per line in year 2000.
For a target number of users, the HCPM uses the geographic characteristics of wire centers and
input prices to calculate the minimum total cost of building and operating the local network.
The HCPM also provides an estimate of the cost of capital of regulated ILECs: 11.25%. This
figure is based on the target returns for the price cap programs of the FCC in the 1990s. I use
the evolution of corporate bond rates to proxy for the change in the cost of capital and obtain
an updated estimate of 8.75 %.8 Appendix A provides additional details on the implementation
of the HCPM. Panel (c) of Table 1 provides summary statistics for the HCPM average cost.
4 Model
I will henceforth use the term local market rather than wire center. In Section 4.1, I set up
the demand model. The reader exclusively interested in demand can read this subsection and
skip ahead to estimation and results in 5.1, 6.1 and 6.2. Section 4.2 sets up the maximization
problem of the regulator. Sections 4.3 and 4.4 form the first order conditions derived from
the optimization problem in 4.2. Section 5.2. ahead adapts the first order conditions to the
estimation procedure. The derivations are presented for a given state s so I save the inclusion
of subindex s in functions to lighten notation. I summarize the notation employed throughout
sections 4 and 5 in Table 2.
8The original computation assumes 44% of debt in the capital structure, a cost of debt of 8.8% and cost of
equity of 13.2%. The evolution of Moody’s Baa Corporate Bonds is used to measure the decrease in the cost of
equity from 1991 to 2000. See pp. 74-76 in Uri (2004) for a more detailed review of the argument.
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4.1 Demand for Residential Telephone Access
I derive the local market demand function by applying a random utility model to the local
market level. A state s is divided into Zs price zones and each price zone contains Nzs local
markets. A household i in local market j ∈ {1, ..., Nzs} at a price zone z ∈ {1, ...Zs} obtains
random utility uijz from access to the local telephone network. Formally,
uijz = xjzβ − #pzi · αi + ξjz + ijz (1)
where xjz is a (1×X1) vector of observed local market characteristics affecting the mean value
of service (for example, ethnic composition and number of households in the local calling area).
Net Prices are listed in the (1×2) vector #pzi ≡ [#pzi(m), #pzi(c)], where #pzi(m) is the net monthly
fee and #pzi(c) is the net connection charge faced by household i.9 The subindex i indicates that
discounts are a function of the income of household i.
The price coefficients are in a (2 × 1) vector αi ≡ [αi(m), αi(c)]T , where αi(m) equals
the household i marginal utility of income (MUI) and αi(c) equals the marginal utility from
a connection charge reduction. The connection charge is a one time payment for household i
and the equivalent monthly perpetual payment equals #pzi(c) · ri, where ri is the discount rate of
the household. The disutility from the payment #pzi(c) still depends on the marginal utility of
income αi(m), so αi(c) = ri · αi(m). I assume αi(m) to be inversely proportional to household
income Ii leading to the specification:10
αi = [α(m)/Ii, α(c)/Ii]
T
where α ≡ [α(m), α(c)]T are constants. The unobserved elements of utility include the mean
market quality ξjz (unobserved to the econometrician but available to the rest of agents) and a
9Net prices #pzi are calculated as the difference of regular prices pz and discounts dzi for low income consumers:
#pzi = pz − dzi. Note that pz ≡ [pz(m), pz(c)] and dzi ≡ [dzi(m), dzi(c)]. The term #pz denotes the set of all net
prices in zone z.
10This formulation is a linear approximation to the disutility of price in the logarithmic term
[log(Ii − pzi(m)− r · pzi(z))− log(Ii)] · α derived from a Cobb-Douglas utility function in BLP (1995) and
assuming the same discount for all households. I lack data to allow varying discounts r .
purely idiosyncratic shock ijz with the standard Type-I (Gumbell) extreme value distribution.
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The distribution of ξjz is left unspecified. The telephone adoption choice of a household depends
only on the difference between uijz and the utility of the best outside option uijz0. The mean
utility of the outside option, xjz0β0+ξjz0, is normalized to zero, as it is standard in the literature,
and uijz0 is subject to the shock ijz0 with the logit form. The distributional assumptions on
ijz, ijz0 allow me to derive an analytic expression for the probability of telephone adoption of
household i at location jz:
Pijz(xjz, #pzi, ξjz, Ii,ΘD) =
exp(xjzβ − #pzi · αi + ξjz)
1 + exp(xjzβ − #pzi · αi + ξjz)
(2)
where ΘD condenses the demand side parameters. The expectation of Pijz with respect to
household income Ii (both αi and #pzi are a function of income) yields the proportion of house-
holds Pjz with local telephone service at location jz. That is,
Pjz(xjz, #pz, ξjz,ΘD) =
 
A(I), A()
Pijz(xjz, #pzi, ξjz, Ii,ΘD)dFjz (3)
Income and idiosyncratic shocks have the distribution functions Fjz(I) and F (), with den-
sity functions fjz(I) and f() and support in A(I) and A() . The integration term dFjz is:
dFjz = fjz(I) · f() · dI · d
The demand Djz in market j in zone z is simply the product of Pjz and the number of
households Mjz. I also use the probability of adoption Pjzg and the demand Djzg of a specific
demographic group g by drawing households exclusively from the distribution of this group,
i. e. Fjz(I, |i ∈ g).11 In particular, I can compute the probability of adoption of households
divided in G income levels.
11For example, the demand Djz at location jz with a group 1 and a group 2 can be equivalently recovered as
Pjz ·Mjz = Djz or Pjz1 ·Mjz1 + Pjz2 ·Mjz2 = (Pjz1 · Prjz(i ∈ 1) + Pjz2 · Prjz(i ∈ 2)) ·Mjz = Pjz ·Mjz = Djz.
Here, Prjz(i ∈ g) denotes the proportion of the population belonging to group g.
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4.2 The Regulator
I consider a set of state regulators s ∈ {1, ...S} with jurisdiction over multiple local markets
distributed across a set of price zones {1, ...Zs} for each state s. The set of price zones is taken
as an exogenous constraint for regulator s. The redefinition of the price zones would require
a different regulatory procedure and higher administrative costs. The policy experiments in
Section 7.2 reveal that the welfare costs of the zone pricing restrictions are small, indicating
that the local markets in a zone are homogeneous. If regulators are informed of this fact, they
will be reluctant to redefine the price zones for a moderate welfare gain.
In each price zone z ∈ {1, ...Zs}, the regulator chooses a net residential monthly price #pzg(m)
for each of the different groups of residential users g ∈ {1, ..., G}. The term #pzg is (1×2) vector
that combines #pzg(m) and net connection price #pzg(c) for a group g. The full set of net prices
in a zone z is denoted as #pz ≡ {#pz1, ..., #pzg, ..., #pzG}.
I focus on the decision over the monthly charge #pzg(m), which constitutes the main expense
associated to local phone service for consumers. The connection charge #pzg(c) is assumed ex-
ogenous, as it is set at the state level and represents a small fraction of residential telephone
revenues. The results in Ackerberg et al. (2008) and the tests in the Appendix E also provide
empirical evidence of the exogeneity of #pzg(c) with respect to unobserved local demand condi-
tions. I assume an objective function Ws for regulator s that captures the trade-off between
consumer surplus and profits in the choice of #pzg(m). That is,
Ws = E

Zs
z=1

Nzs
j=1
G
g=1
λzg · CSjzg(#pzg, .) + πjzg(#pzg, .)

| ιs

(4)
where πjzg and CSjzg are the profit of the firm and consumer surplus from residential local
telephone use of group g in local market jz. The term λzg is the welfare weight of the regulator
on consumers of group g (with respect to the firm) in price zone z. The objective function of
the regulator is the expected weighted welfare E[ . | ιs] given its information set ιs.
I adapt the general model to the regime of subsidies implemented through the Lifeline
and Linkup programs. I set the number of groups to G = 2 for a subsidy eligible (low income)
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consumer group and a non-eligible consumer group. Given this degree of flexibility for regulatory
pricing, the variation of prices across zones or customer types might respond to different demand
and cost conditions across groups and zones, or dispersion in the λzg weights.
A regulator with bias is still constrained by the need of the firm to break even at the state
level. The recovery of a minimum revenue base from the regulated local telephone activity might
be required by state statutes and, even if this requirement is lax, the regulator is constrained
by the possibility of bankruptcy. The profit constraint of the regulator is then given by:
E

Zs
z=1
Nzs
j=1
2
g=1
πjzg(#pzg, .)−Bs | ιs

≥ 0 (5)
where Bs is the required profit from local residential phone service in state s. The term Bs
reasonably increases in the level of debt of the regulated company and it decreases with the
size of the profits from other services offered (business local telephone service, etc.) and profits
from other states in which the firm operates. I do not specify Bs, as it is no part of the welfare
changes induced by the price variations used in Section (5.2) to identify the welfare weights.
Consumer Surplus
The expected total consumer surplus is derived as the product of the total number of
households and the expectation of household surplus with respect to the household income and
idiosyncratic shocks. The mean market value at every local market jz, δjz = xjzβ + ξjz, forms
part of the information set of the regulator. This is reasonable given that local telephone is a
mature sector where regulators are likely to have good information about mean local market
conditions but they lack detailed micro data. Formally, consumer surplus at location j in zone
z for group g is given by:
E

CSjzg(xjz, #pz, ξjz,ΘD) | ιs

=Mjzg ·
 
A(I)
1
αi(m)
 
A()
(xjzβ − #pzg · αi + ξjz + ijz) dFjzg
where Mjzg denotes the number of households in a group g at location j in zone z and division
by the MUI, αi(m), reduces the consumer surplus to monetary units comparable with the profit
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 19 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1201
of the firm. The notation in equation (4) is expanded here to account for dependence on all
demand variables and parameters. The term dFjzg incorporates the density with respect to
income and the idiosyncractic shock for group g. That is,
dFjzg = fjzg(I) · f() · dI · d
The logit form of ijz also allows to write the above formula for consumer surplus more
explicitly as:
E

CSjzg(xjz, #pzg, ξjz,ΘD) | ιs

=Mjzg ·
 
A(I)
Ln

1 + exp(xjzβ − #pzg · αi + ξjz)

αi(m)
fjzg(I)dI
Given G = 2 consumer groups and Nzs local markets inside a price zone, the total consumer
surplus evaluated by the regulator is:
Zs
z=1
Nzs
j=1
2
g=1
λzg · E [CSjzg(#pzg, .) | ιs]
where notation for all arguments except net prices #pzg has been omitted.
Profit
The regulator’s expectation of the profit of the firm in local market jz for each group
g depends on the expected demand function Djzg, net monthly price #pzg(m) and net connection
charge #pzg(c), the monthly discount of the firm rs, expected marginal monthly cost per line
mcjz and expected fixed cost Kjz. The connection charge #pzg(c) is a one time revenue and I
use the cost of capital in the HCPM (8.75%) to proxy for the discount rate rs and compute
a monthly payment comparable to the monthly fee #pzg(m).12 The knowledge of mean value
δjz allows the regulator to calculate the expected rate of adoption Pjzg as in (3) and expected
demand Djzg =Mjzg · Pjzg.
12The adjusted monthly connection charge is simply given by #pzg(c) · rs. This form of firm revenues neglects
the fact that #pzg(c) represents a sunk cost for a majority of consumers but it is a good aproximation as long
as regulated monthly prices are not set high enough that a substantial fraction of the installed base decides to
drop local telephone service.
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The profit function and the first order conditions with respect to prices in sections 4.3 and
4.4 are assumed to be linear in cost terms. It is then possible to integrate with respect to
the distribution of cost and input the regulator’s best estimate for cost terms E [mcjz | ιs] and
E [Kjz | ιs] in these expressions. I then write expected monthly profits at jz from group g as:
E [πjzg(#pzg, .) | ιs] = (#pzg(m) + #pzg(c) · rs − E [mcjz | ιs]) ·Djzg − (1/G) · E [Kjz | ιs] (6)
The profit of the firm operating in state s results from the sum of revenues and costs across
the different price zones {1, 2, ..., Zs} and the local markets inside each zone:
E [πs(#p1, ..., #pz, ..., #pZs) | ιs] =
Zs
z=1
Nzs
j=1
2
g=1
E [πjzg(#pzg, .) | ιs]
The use of net prices #pzg in (6) assumes full internalization of the cost of price discount pro-
grams by state regulators. However, the discounts are not entirely funded from state sources but
also disbursements from the federal Universal Service Fund (USF). State regulators might still
weigh the costs of USF funds if higher future contributions to USF, or increased administrative
costs, are associated to a greater current use of the USF. I formulate in the next subsection a
model with partial internalization of subsidy costs and I estimate both models.
The regulator’s best estimate of marginal cost is assumed linear in a set cost shifters E [mcjz | ι
E [mcjz | ιs] =
mcjz = γ · Costjz + ωjz (7)
It is possible to impose analogous structure into E[Kjz| ιs], but this will not affect the
estimation procedure based on the marginal variation in the number of lines.
shifters Costjz and a mean independent shock ωjz:
γ · Costjz. This is formally equivalent to the marginal cost being linear in the
vector of cost
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Regulatory Bias
The weight λzg that the regulator places in the consumer surplus of group g in zone z is
assumed to depend on the political characteristics of the regulator (direct election, party affili-
ation, etc.) and demographic characteristics of the constituency inside the price zone z. This
set of variables is summarized as Polzg. As an example, the availability of affordable telephone
service in rural areas might a priori yield higher political benefits and regulators will put more
weight on the consumer surplus in these areas. The following functional form is adopted:
log (λzg) = φ · Polzg + ηzg (8)
where φ is a vector of parameters and ηzg is a mean independent shock. I denote the parameters
(φ, γ) jointly as Θs capturing the impact of cost and policy shifters. The regulator knows its
own preferences so λzg rather than E [λzg | ιs] is used to compute Ws.
4.3 Local Tariff Choice
Given the assumptions in the model, the choice of the net monthly fee #pzg(m) for each price
zone z and group g satisfies the following first order condition:
∂Ws
∂#pzg(m)
= E

Nzs
j=1
∂CSjzg(.)
∂#pzg(m)
· λzg
1 + μs
+
Nzs
j=1
∂πjzg(.)
∂#pzg(m)
| ιs

= 0
where μs denotes the Lagrangian multiplier on the budget constraint restriction at the state
level in equation (5). A more useful representation of the problem given G = 2 considers the
choice for each zone z of a general price pz(m) and a discount for the low income group dz(m).
The net monthly prices satisfy #pz1(m) = pz(m) and #pz2(m) = pz(m) − dz(m), where g = 2 is
the low income group. The first order conditions in each zone z are now:
∂Ws
∂pz(m)
= E

Nzs
j=1
2
g=1

∂CSjzg(.)
∂pz(m)
· λzg
1 + μs
+
∂πjzg(.)
∂pz(m)

| ιs

= 0 (9)
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∂Ws
∂dz(m)
= E

Nzs
j=1
∂CSjz2(.)
∂dz(m)
· λz2
1 + μs
+
∂πjz2(.)
∂dz(m)
| ιs

= 0 (10)
I will use equations (9) and (10) as reference for the estimation section below. It is immediate
to rewrite these first order conditions as a function of demand and cost factors expected by
the regulator according to the information in ιs. The expansion of (9) and (10) with the best
estimate of costs based in (7) would yield:
Nzs
j=1
2
g=1

−Djzg · λzg
1 + μs
+Djzg +
∂Djzg
∂pz(m)
· (#pzg(m) + #pzg(c) · rs − γ · Costjz)

= 0 (11)
Nzs
j=1

Djz2 · λz2
1 + μs
−Djz2 +
∂Djz2
∂dz(m)
· (#pz2(m) + #pz2(c) · rs − γ · Costjz)

= 0 (12)
4.4 Interaction between State and Federal Regulators
The regulator can orient the pricing of local telephone services to obtain funds from the federal
Lifeline and High Cost Model programs described in Section 3 and Appendix A. I incorporate
the federal Lifeline program by redefining the low income profit πjz2(#pz2, .) as:
πjz2(#pz2, .) = (pz(m) + #pz2(c) · rs −mcjz) ·Djz2 − L(dz(m) ·Djz2)−Kjz/2 (13)
where L(.) is a C1 function representing the state cost of Lifeline subsidies. In the base case in
(6), L(dz(m) ·Djz2) = dz(m) ·Djz2, and the total cost of the Lifeline subsidy is fully internalized
at the state level. A general form for L(.) allows the state cost, L(dz(m) ·Djz2), to diverge from
the actual amount of subsidy, dz(m) ·Djz2. For example, the federal Lifeline funds might not
be computed as a cost by state regulators and L(dz(m) ·Djz2) ≤ dz(m) ·Djz2. In Section 5.2, I
use the information on the federal Lifeline program to approximate L(.).
The participation in the high cost program adds a separate correction HCSs for the profits
of a state s. These states will receive a subsidy per telephone line equal to 76% of the excess
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of the average cost per line over the national benchmark. Formally,
HCSs =

Zs
z=1
Nzs
j=1
ljz + ls

· 0.76 ·max
⎛
⎝
$Zs
z=1
Nzs
j=1 TCjz + TCs
%
$Zs
z=1
Nzs
j=1 ljz + ls
% − nb, 0
⎞
⎠
where ljz (TCjz) denotes the number of residential lines (total cost) of the regulated firm in
local market jz and ls (TCs) denotes all other telephone lines (total cost) in state s. The nb
term denotes the national benchmark for the monthly cost per line ($23.35). I assume that the
expected number of lines in local market jz will equate expected demand so E[ljz|ιs] = Djz1 +
Djz2. For a state in the high cost program, the expected marginal profit E[∂πjzg(.)/∂pz(m)|ιs]
is then corrected with the following term:
∂HCSjzg
∂pz(m)
= 0.76 · (mcjz − nb) · ∂Djzg∂pz(m) (14)
This implies that increasing the number of lines in local markets below (above) the national
benchmark cost per line reduces (increases) the total high cost contribution to the state. The
variation of the discount dzg(m) also affects the number of lines so ∂HCSs(.)/∂dzg(m) can
be calculated analogously. In year 2000, all the states in the sample that participated in the
hold-harmles program had stopped receiving these subsidies. I include the description of the
hold-harmless adjustment in Appendix A for completeness, but it will not affect estimation.
The incorporation of the Lifeline and Linkup adjustments to the first order conditions in (9)
and (10) yields the equations:
E

Nzs
j=1
2
g=1

∂CSjzg(.)
∂pz(m)
· λzg
1 + μs
+
∂πjzg(.)
∂pz(m)
+
∂HCSjzg
∂pz(m)

| ιs

= 0
E

Nzs
j=1
∂CSjz2(.)
∂dz(m)
· λz2
1 + μs
+
∂πjz2(.)
∂dz(m)
+
∂HCSjzg
∂dzg(m)
| ιs

= 0
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where expectations of ∂πjz2(.)/∂pz(m) and ∂πjz2(.)/∂dz(m) are now given by:
E [∂πjz2(.)/∂pz(m) | ιs] = −∂L(dz(m) ·Djz2)∂pz(m)
+Djz2 +
∂Djz2
∂pz(m)
· (pz2(m) + #pz2(c) · rs − γ · Costjz)
E [∂πjz2(.)/∂dz(m) | ιs] = −∂L(dz(m) ·Djz2)∂dz(m)
+
∂Djz2
∂dz(m)
· (pz2(m) + #pz2(c) · rs − γ · Costjz)
5 Estimation
The approach employed to identify and estimate the parameters of the model (α, β, γ, φ) relies
on the orthogonality of unobserved demand and supply shocks (ξ,ω, η) to exogenous geographic,
demographic and political factors. Given demand side instruments (W ), cost shifters (Cost)
and policy shifters (Pol), the set of orthogonality conditions E [ξ ·W ] = 0, E [ω · Cost] = 0
and E [η · Pol] = 0 can be used to derive a GMM estimator of the parameters, as in Hansen
(1982) and Newey and Mcfadden (1994). I also use simulation to form the sample analogs to
demand moments E [ξ ·W ]. This follows the empirical strategy introduced by Berry (1994)
and BLP (1995). Pakes and Pollard (1989) and Mcfadden (1989) provide a general framework
for estimation with simulated moments.
The formal model in Section 4 must be a good description of the actual price setting process
of the regulator to identify correctly the regulator’s weights λ and the parameters φ control-
ling the relation between weights λ and policy variables Pol. For example, the exclusion of
unobserved legal constraints will affect the estimates of λ, and it is then possible to attribute
the observed prices to unequal welfare weights when these prices are indeed determined by the
legal constraints. Examples of these potential constraints are legal limits to the creation of price
zones or to the ability to set different low income subsidies in different geographic zones. If this
misspecification problem is present, the estimates of λ would still be an informative index of the
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departure from Ramsey pricing, but they could not be interpreted as preferences weights. This
is a common limitation of structural estimation. The classical studies of market competition of
Bresnahan (1982) and Lau (1982), reviewed for example in Perloff et al. (2007), estimate the
conjectural variations of firms under their maintained assumptions, but these estimates can be
interpreted more generally as measures of price-cost margins.
The methodology is detailed next with the main steps including (i) recovery of (ξ,ω, η) (ii)
choice of instruments and (iii) and moment construction.
5.1 Recovering the Shock on Demand
I define n ∈ {1, ..., N} as an index over the total number of local market observations, whereN =
S
s=1
Zs
z=1Nzs. I estimate the telephone penetration implied by the model in (3) with the sim-
ulation of a sample of H = 100 households for each local market n. The empirical distribution
of household income #Fn(I) from the US Census (2000) is used to generate the simulated income
samples. Given (#Ii)Hi=1, it is possible to generate a sample (#αi, #pin)Hi=1 of individual household
price coefficients and net prices given the specification in Section 4.1. Assuming knowledge of
(xn, ξn,ΘD), I can obtain the following simulated analog of (3):
#Pn(xn, #pn, ξn,ΘD) =
1
H
·
H
i=1
Pin(xn, #pin, ξn, #αi,ΘD)
The estimation algorithm considered in BLP(1995) computes next the mean market value
δn with the equality of the simulated model penetration #Pn with the actual penetration level
sn. The estimate of !δn makes immediate to extract !ξn = !δn − xnβ. I solve for !δn by iteration
steps of the form:
δit+1n = log (sn)− log


#Pn(δitn , .)

+ δitn (15)
This procedure cannot use observations with sn = 1 as the infinite support of in excludes
#Pin(.) = 1, and (15) neglects that #Pn(δn, .) = sn for finite number of households H. This forces
me to discard 264 observations (3.7% of sample). The percentage of observations discarded
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is low and the small differences in penetration between the full and selected sample shown in
Table 1 also reduce the possibility of selection problems.
The iterative procedure in equation (15) can be applied separately to each market,13 but the
speed of the computation increases by use of the standard practice of solving simultaneously for
the constants δ in multiple markets. The algorithm employed starts applying the iteration step
in (15) to the whole sample of 6854 local markets. After a number of iterations, the algorithm
finds the solution !δ for a subset of markets, and iteration step in (15) is further applied only to
markets for which a solution !δ has not been reached. See Appendix B for the implementation.
5.2 Recovering the Shock on the Regulator’s Weights
The first order conditions in (9) and (10) are the base to form the sample analogs of E [η · Pol] =
0. The estimation approach searches for the unobserved weights λ that satisfy (9) and (10)
and make prices at least locally optimal. The error η is then recovered by applying on λ the
structure in equation (8). The policy shifters (Pol) are divided into a set of state indicators
(1s) and all other policy variables describing observed demographic and political characteristics
of the price zones and states (Pol_S).
Local Market Level mc, Group-Zone Level λ
In this section, marginal cost mc is estimated from the HCPM cost data. Appendix C
adapts the framework to consider unobserved mc and points to the limits of the information
contained in the first order conditions. The total cost value in the HCPM, TCHCPM , is used
as a proxy for the true total cost in each local market. It is then possible to estimate a general
cost equation:
TCHCPM ,q = g (Costq, γ) + ωq (16)
13Separate computation for each market is also possible when more than one option per market is available.
In that case, it is necessary to solve simultaneously for all δ inside a market, as the predicted share of a given
option is a function of all δ terms in that market. The problems for the different markets are however still
separable.
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Given a specification of g(., .) linear in γ, I can obtain "mcq = !γ·Cost_mcq, whereCost_mcq ⊆
Costq, as not all the cost shifters affecting TCHCPM necessarily shift "mcq.
I assume that state regulators use "mcq as best estimate of marginal cost E [mcjz | ιs] =
γ · Costjz as in (7) and put a different weight λzg for each zone z and group g as in (8).
Given an estimate "mcjz of E [mcjz | ιs], it is then possible to expand E [∂πjzg(.)/∂pz(m) | ιs]
and E [∂πjz2(.)/∂dz(m) | ιs] as in equations (11) and (12). For a given z and g, it is immediate
to obtain from (9) and (10) that:
λz1
1 + μs
= −E

Nzs
j=1
∂πjz1(.)
∂pz(m)
| ιs

/E

Nzs
j=1
∂CSjz1(.)
∂pz(m)
| ιs

(17)
λz2
1 + μs
= −E

Nzs
j=1
∂πjz2(.)
∂dz(m)
| ιs

/E

Nzs
j=1
∂CSjz2(.)
∂dz(m)
| ιs

If I substitute for the profit and consumer surplus derivatives in (17), I obtain:
λz1
1 + μs
= 1 +

Nzs
j=1
∂Djz1
∂pz(m)
· (#pzg(m) + #pzg(c) · rs − "mcjz)

· 1
Nzs
j=1
Djz1
This expression shows that the presence of positive (negative) markups over cost measure
"mcjz decreases (increases) the estimated weight, and they do more so the higher the absolute
value of ∂Djzg/∂pz(m). Note that the presence of the Lagrangian multiplier μs prevents the
immediate recovery of λzg. However, I could take the expression in (17) for zone 1 and group
Section 6, I use a simple specification of g(., .) linear in γ as in Rosston et al.(2008). The
set of cost observations q ∈ {1, ..., Q} coincides with the set of all available local markets
n ∈ {1, ..., N}. The HCPM uses a target number of residential lines in each local market,
reslines, as input to calculate total cost. I derive then the estimate "mcq of marginal cost :
"mcq = ∂g (Costq, γˆ) /∂reslines
where g (., .) is a C1 function of cost shifters Costq and parameters γ. In the application in
t cq ⊆
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 28 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1201
1 as a base to obtain for each group g and zone z the ratio:14
λ∗zg =
λzg
λ11
=
E

Nzs
j=1
∂πjzg(.)
∂pz(m) | ιs

/E

Nzs
j=1
∂CSjzg(.)
∂pz(m) | ιs

E

N1s
j=1
∂πj11(.)
∂p1(m) | ιs

/E

N1s
j=1
∂CSj11(.)
∂p1(m) | ιs
 (18)
For example, a state with two zones will yield four ratios λ∗11 = λ11/λ11 = 1, λ
∗
12 = λ12/λ11,
λ∗21 = λ21/λ11 and λ
∗
22 = λ22/λ11. An alternative approach would add to Polv the state dummies
in 1(s)v. The index v ∈ {1, ..., V } over the set of all available welfare weights in the data is
defined by V =
S
s=1 2 ·Zs (twice the number of zones). The following welfare weight equation
is taken to the data:
log(λv)− log(1 + μs) =
S
s=2
φs · 1(s)v + φ · Pol_Sv + ηv (19)
The state fixed effects φs control for the effect of − log(1+μs) and any other possible state-
level unobserved heterogeneity. These fixed effects are estimated by including the (1 × (S −
1)) vector of state dummy variables 1(s)v. The inclusion of state fixed effects φs also limits the
variables that can be included into the set of all other policy variables (Pol_Sv). For example,
the coefficient on a state dummy for a directly elected regulator (Electedv) can not be separately
identified from the state fixed effect. However, it is possible to identify the differential effect of
Electedv on the weights of low income consumers with the inclusion of Electedv · Ipoor,v. The
variable Ipoor,v ⊆ Pol_Sv is an indicator for λv corresponding to the low income group and it
avoids the perfect correlation with the state dummies 1(s)v.
Local Market Level mc, Group-Zone Level λ and Federal Interaction
I modify the previous specification to introduce the state incentives to obtain federal subsi-
dies in Section 4. I use the actual design of the Lifeline program to form two different approxima-
14The ratio in (18) assumes a group g that is not eligible so the derivatives ∂πjzg(.)/∂pzg(m) and
∂CSjzg(.)/∂pz(m) are used. If the group is eligible, I use derivatives with respect to dz.
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at a local market jz with a discount dz(m) ≤ $10.5 the following correction to ∂πjz2(.)/∂dz(m):
∂L(dz(m) ·Djz2)
∂dz(m)
=
2
3
·

(dz(m)− 5.25) · ∂Djz2∂dz(m) +Djz2

(20)
The term in (20) is the marginal state cost at local market jz of increasing the Lifeline
discount dz(m). This derivative captures the federal matching of state Lifeline contributions
described in Section 3.1 and Appendix A. Federal matching reduces the marginal state cost of
the subsidy to 2/3 of the marginal increase in total subsidy dollars. Federal funds also cover a
basic level of Lifeline subsidy equal of $5.25 and reduce the gross state subsidy contribution to
dz(m)− 5.25. The federal matching applies as long as the discount dz(m) does not exceed the
program cap of $10.5. I use a different correction at local markets with dz(m) > $10.5:15
∂L( dz(m) ·Djz2 )
∂dz(m)
=

2
3
· (10.5− 5.25) + (dz(m)− 10.5)

· ∂Djz2
∂dz(m)
+Djz2 (21)
The correction in (20) applies for all states except Massachusetts, Maryland and Rhode
Island, which have Lifeline subsidies significantly above the matching region. In Federal I,
states at the margin (a subsidy level at the minimum dz(m) = 5.25 or at dz(m) = 10.5) are
assigned the marginal state cost in (20). This is the minimal approximation to the marginal
state subsidy cost at the margin and it can overstate the federal portion of the subsidy.
The specification Federal II assigns a lower fraction of federal funds to the 17 states that
set dz(m) at the margin. The specification Federal II is the maximal approximation to the
marginal subsidy cost at the margin and it might understate the federal portion of the subsidy.
This is the opposite case to specification Federal I. States with a contribution dz(m) = 10.5
are assigned now a correction equal to (21) rather than (20). States with a contribution equal
to the minimum dz(m) = 5.25 are also assigned the full marginal cost of the subsidy, which is
in this case:
15Given the scheme described in Appendix A, the total state Lifeline subsidy dsz for a choice of total subsidy
dz in [$5.25, $10.5] is given by dsz + 0.5 · dsz = dz − $5.25→ dsz = (2/3) · (dz − $5.25).
tions to the function L(.) for the state cost of this subsidy. The specification Federal I appends
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∂L( dz(m) ·Djz2 )
∂dz(m)
= (dz(m)− 5.25) · ∂Djz2∂dz(m) +Djz2
The correction for the high cost program participation described in sections 3.2 and 4.4 is
straightforward. I append a term as in (14) to the marginal profit expressions in (9) and (10) for
the participating states. There is no need to adjust the profits of states receiving hold-harmless
contributions since these subsidies were not received after year 2000 for the hold-harmless states
in the sample (AR, CO, KY, NM, SC).
5.3 Identification
This section outlines how the data sources are used to identify and estimate the different
parameters. I refer the reader to Section 3 and Appendix A for the full description of the
variables.
The variation in the cross section of demographics (ethnic groups, total number of house-
holds, etc.) identifies demand parameters in β. As for the price coefficients α, I rely on price and
income distribution variation across local markets. For local markets with comparable prices
and demographics (excluding income), the difference in the distribution of income contributes
to explain differences in penetration levels. The coefficients α(m) and α(c) are separately iden-
tified through the fact that monthly prices are a recurrent cost for households whereas the
connection charge is a one-time payment. Monthly prices are not exogenous, but endogenously
chosen by the regulator, so I use the constrained optimization problem of the regulator as a
basis to find instruments that are correlated with prices but not with the unobserved mean
value ξ.
Suitable demand instruments W include political variables Pol that affect the weights on
consumers λ, and therefore prices, but not the local demand for telephone. Thus, I include in
W : Elected, % Dem − PUC, and % Dem-Leg. Similarly, Business/Residential Ratio and
Competition 95 affect the slackness of the profit constraint of the regulated ILEC, and therefore
prices, but can be assumed uncorrelated with the demand unobservable ξ. The state averages
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of included demographic regressors in x can also be added to W . Prices in every local market
are connected to the demand conditions in all other locations in the state through the presence
of the common budget constraint. At the same time, the average demographic conditions in a
state (excluding local market n) can be assumed uncorrelated with the unobserved mean value
in local market n. A parsimonious set of state controls includes state asian %, state average
income, state income flag (indicator controlling whether the average state income is above the
national average), state % rural and the interaction % Rural · % Dem − PUC. The HCPM
cost measures are redundant given their correlation with geographic variables. Leverage is not
a valid instrument as firms plausibly choose debt as a function of demand and cost conditions.
The weights λ are identified by the assumption of optimality of observed prices and the
regulation model developed in Sections 4 and 5. The HCPM cost data is used to estimate
marginal cost in every local market.
Cost and political shifters include geographic and political factors that can be taken as
exogenous from unobserved conditions in the telephone market such as Total hhs(k), Density,
% Rural or % Poor. The variation of these exogenous variables with respect to weights and
marginal costs identifies the parameters γ and φ.
5.4 GMM Estimator
The derivation above allows to construct a GMM estimator, as in Hansen(1982), based on the
moment conditions E [ξ ·W ] = 0, E [ω · Cost] = 0 and E [η · Pol] = 0 stated at the beginning
of this section. The sample analogs of the moment conditions are collected into the vector
f ≡ (fW , fCost, fPol) where:16
fW =
1
N
·
N
n=1
!ξn ·Wn
fCost =
1
Q
·
Q
q=1
!ωq · Costq
16The exogenous shifters (Cost, Pol) and errors(ω, η) in the cost and policy moments depend on the choice
of model. The cost moment fCost is derived from (16) if HCPM data is used. If mc is directly backed from (9)
and (10), fCost is derived from (26) and (28).
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fPol =
1
V
·
V
v=1
!ηv · Polv
The system formed by the demand moments fW is overidentified so it is not possible to make
f exactly equal to zero. I solve then the program min
ΘD,ΘS
fT · Ω · f where Ω is a robust positive
definite weight matrix.17 I provide details on the standard errors in Appendix D.
6 Results
6.1 Logit Demand Model
I present first a simple logit specification of demand without income effects as reference point
for the rest of results. Individual heterogeneity is limited to the idiosyncratic shocks in.
The mean value of service δn in a local market n is derived from the analytic inversion
δn = ln (sn) − ln (1− sn) used since at least McFadden (1974). The first column of the
All households panel of Table 3 contains the OLS estimates for demand parameters β, where
demand shifters include local market demographics, the number of households in the local
calling area (LCA hhs), regular prices (Monthly_50, Connection) and subsidies (Subsidy_50,
Subsidy_Connection). The subsidies are obtained as the difference of the regular and dis-
counted prices, e.g., Subsidy_50 = Monthly_50 - Monthly_50 (sub). As in Ackerberg et al.
(2008), I present the results for Monthly_50, as it is a conservative measure of basic access
prices. Results for Monthly_100 are comparable. The standard errors Sd(β) are robust to
heterocedasticity and clustering of arbitrary form at the state level.
The OLS price coefficients in Table 3 are all insignificant. However, the potential endo-
geneity of Monthly_50 and Monthly_50 (sub) make OLS results biased and inconsistent. The
OLS estimator ignores the positive correlation between prices and unobserved service quality
and creates a bias toward zero in the price coefficients, as known from the empirical product
differentiation literature. The connection prices are plausibly exogenous as they are set at the
17Ω is chosen a block diagonal matrix containing 2SLS weight matrix for the demand moments

WTn ·Wn
−1
and OLS weights for cost,

CostTq · Costq
−1
, and policy moments,

PolTv · Polv
−1
.
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state level and represent a small dollar amount. It is then unlikely that the connection charge
is based on detailed analysis of local demand conditions. Also, endogeneity tests in Appendix
E do not provide evidence of endogenous connection prices. Strength and validity analysis of
the instruments is also provided in Appendix E.
The importance of controlling for racial factors suggested in the previous literature, Taylor
et al. (1990), Riordan (2002) and Ackerberg et al. (2008), is confirmed with negative and
significant coefficients for %Black hhs, %Native hhs and %Other hhs. The coefficients on
%Rural (−0.36), %MSA (0.25) and Median hh income (0.04) point to the reasonable result
of higher demand for local telephone in wealthier and more urban communities.
The IV column of the All households panel in Table 3 considers endogenous Monthly_50
and Subsidy_50 and it uses the set of instruments in Section 5.3 above to obtain 2SLS esti-
mates. The correction of the endogeneity bias leads to increased price coefficients, Monthly_50
(−0.077) and Subsidy_50 (0.061). The higher price coefficients lead to an increase of the aver-
age elasticity18 of telephone penetration with respect to Monthly_50 from (0.004) to (0.016).
Interestingly, the elasticity for the OLS estimates is close to the result of 0.005 in Hausman et
al. (1993), which abstracts from endogeneity problems, and the significant increase in elasticity
from accounting for endogenous prices is also observed in Ackerberg et al. (2008).
The Poor Households panel in Table 3 reproduces the analysis above only for poor house-
holds assuming that they make use of the subsidized prices Monthly_50(sub) and Connection
(sub). This coincides with the approach in Ackerberg et al. (2008) to control for the differ-
ent price elasticity and price schedule of low income consumers. The results are qualitatively
comparable to the All households panel, but the magnitude of the coefficients changes. In par-
ticular, I observe higher price elasticity (0.024) with respect to Monthly_50(sub), as expected
in the low income group.
18Elasticity at each wire center n is calculated at δ = xβ for service value. A single measure is formed by
averaging wire center elasticities with the wire center’s share of total or poor households as weight. The same
weighting is applied in subection 6.2 ahead.
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6.2 Logit Demand Model with Individual Income Effects
This section presents the results of the full demand model described in Section 4.1. The
estimates of the demographic controls do not differ significantly from the basic logit model.
The interest of the full model is rather in the possibility of estimating a different marginal
price effect for each level of income and assigning to each household the net price corresponding
to its eligibility for Lifeline and Linkup. The variables #pin(m) and #pin(c) are obtained by
subtracting the Lifeline and Linkup discounts, Subsidy_50 and Subsidy_Connection, from
regular prices Monthly_50 and Connection only for eligible low income consumers.19 The
results are presented in column (a) of Table 4. The effect of monthly prices #pin(m) is negative
and significant (−0.382) whereas the connection charge is negative but not significantly different
from zero (−0.068). From the demand model, a household with income (in thousands) Ii will
have price sensitivity coefficient −0.382/Ii. With this figure, I can compute a different elasticity
for each household in a given local market.
Figure 1 presents the elasticity of the probability of adoption to price #pin(m) for income
levels ranging from $5, 000 to $40, 000, with the mean value of service xβ at the sample median
values of x. Elasticity declines quickly as the level of income of the household increases and it
is significantly higher for the lowest income levels.20 The use of average elasticity masks this
variation across income levels. The average market demand elasticity for All households is
(0.017), which represents an intermediate value between the elasticities for households in the
low income (0.055) and normal income (0.002) groups. A Wald test for the difference of the
elasticity for Normal Income households and Low Income households rejects the hypothesis
of a zero difference between the average elasticities of these two groups.
Figure 2 presents the results for a particular local market (observation 73 in South Carolina)
in the sample, with relatively low penetration (0.88). The pattern of elasticities is similar to the
19I choose Ii ≤ $20, 000 to classify a household as low income. Poverty threshold in 2000 ranged from $8, 350
to $17, 050 for households of size from 1 to 4 in the poverty guidelines. Eligibility for Lifeline and Linkup
varies for each state but it is usually laxer than proof of poverty status (income at or below 135% or 150% of
the poverty line,participation in welfare programs). It is not possible to control perfectly for eligibility with
aggregate data but it is possible to check for the robustness of the results to different assumptions.
20Elasticty for households with income below $5, 000 ranges from 4.94 to 0.05. These levels were not included
in order to preserve a proper scale in the figure.
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calculation for the hypothetical local market in Figure 1 but the levels are higher. For example,
a household with an income of $24, 000 exhibits an elasticity close to 0.05 in the local market
in Figure 2 whereas it presents an elasticity below 0.01 for the hypothetical local market in
Figure 1.
The model estimates in column (b) of Table 4 account for the fact that participation in the
subsidy programs is below 100% by assigning the discounted prices in every market only to a
fraction of eligible consumers equal to the participation rate in the Lifeline program at the state
level. This leads to a reduction of the estimated price coefficient to (−0.322). The coefficient
for the connection turns positive (0.02) but it cannot be statistically distinguished from zero.
This reduction in the price coefficient is translated into a small change in the elasticities for
All households (0.016) and Low Income households (0.054). Alternative specifications based
on the price proxy Monthly_100 also yield comparable results. Given the robustness of the
results to the correction of the participation rate in Lifeline, I will use the base specification
in column (a) of Table 4 for the remaining sections.
6.3 Expected Marginal Cost
I examine different cost specifications linear in parameters γ to estimate the regulator’s expected
marginal cost E [mcjz | ιs] . Cost shifters Costp include the HCPM targets for residential, busi-
ness and special access lines (Res Lines, Bus Lines, Sa Lines), geography (Area in squared
miles, % Rural, %MSA) and interactions. The HCPM target lines are valid exogenous regres-
sors because they are based on population data and target levels of service in the HCPM rather
than actual demand.
The results reproduce the cost estimation in Rosston et al. (2008) and the method is com-
parable to the estimation approach put forward in Gasmi et al. (2002). I report in Table 5 a
representative subset of the cost estimates. Column (a) presents OLS results for a regression of
total cost on the numbers of the different types of telephone lines. This regression provides the
average marginal cost for each type of line across the sample. In column (b), I add interactions
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with Area (Area·Res Lines, Area·Bus Lines...) and, in column (c), I add interactions between
the different types of lines (Res Lines·Bus Lines, Res Lines·Sa Lines). This is a simple im-
plementation of equation (16), where function g(γ, Costn) is assumed linear in the parameters.
For example, the model in column (a) is given by:
TCHCPM, q = γ0 + γ1Res Linesq + γ2Bus Linesq + γ3Sa Linesq + γ4Areaq + ωq
For this simple model, the marginal cost "mcqis simply equal to !γ1. The estimates of "mcq
in columns (b) and (c) are obtained analogously. In all specifications, the average estimated
marginal cost is close to $23 with a maximum standard error of $ 2.6. Table 5 contains summary
statistics of "mcq for the different specifications.
6.4 Regulator´s Welfare Weights
I estimate welfare weights following the method presented in Section 5.2. For the cost estimates
"mcq, I use two specifications: (i) the MC specification considers marginal cost equal to the
estimates from model (b) in Table 5 and (ii) the AC specification considers marginal cost equal
to HCPM average cost. This second specification checks for the robustness of the results to the
assumptions on E[mc|ιs]. The average cost is a crude but readily available proxy for the actual
marginal cost per line, and it is of interest to examine the weights required to rationalize prices
for a regulator that uses this cost approximation.
The panel Base scenario of Table 6 contains the results for the model with full internaliza-
tion of subsidy costs by state regulators. The policy controls include IPoor, which is an indicator
for whether a given weight corresponds to the low income group. This indicator IPoor is inter-
acted with other policy shifters, e. g., Elected (Direct Election) or the price zone average of
% Rural, to capture the differential effect of these variables on the weight of the low income
group. The estimates are qualitatively comparable between the AC and MC specifications so
I focus on the latter.
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in poor areas given significant estimates % Poor (−0.18) and % Poor ·IPoor (0.79). I do not find
strong evidence in favor of the presence of rural bias with insignificant estimates% Rural (0.003)
for the general population and % Rural · IPoor (0.042) for the low income consumers. The
coefficients on the rural population factors are however significant for the AC specification,
as the higher imputed marginal cost per line in rural areas requires a higher weight on rural
consumers to rationalize prices. The suppression of the downward bias for regular consumers
in poor areas would lead to lower regular local telephone prices in accordance with the lower
value of the service in those areas. On the contrary, poor consumers would observe an increase
in subsidized prices if the bias is eliminated.
The importance of weight biases is moderated by the fact that the Wald test W-test
Weights fails to reject that the sum of squared weight differences in the sample is zero for both
the AC and MC specifications. The Figure 3 plots the sorted differences in welfare weights
and error bands for the MC specification. The figure also suggests that the observed welfare
weight differences are not significantly different from zero, butW −test Weights provides more
formal evidence.
The specifications in Federal I and Federal II modify the regulatory problem to accom-
modate the possibility that state regulators do not internalize fully the federal cost of subsidy
programs. As described in sections 4.3 and 5.2, the specification in Federal I provides to state
regulators stronger incentives than Federal II to increase the telephone use among low income
households. The previous results on the effect of % Poor on weights are reversed. In areas
with higher percentage of poor population, I observe now higher weight in favor of the general
population and less weight in favor of low income population. The federal Lifeline program
makes price subsidies less costly for state regulators, and the new estimated weight differences
are required to rationalize that the observed discounted prices are not lower.
The conclusions under Federal I are qualitatively robust to the specification of mar-
ginal cost so I will focus again on MC. In Table 6 Federal I MC, I observe the estimates
% Rural (−0.012), % Poor (0.88), % Rural · IPoor (0.064) and % Poor · IPoor (−0.514). Only
% Poor and % Rural · IPoor are statistically significant in this subset of coefficients. The higher
I observe that the estimated weight on the general (poor) population decreases (increases)
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weight for poor consumers in zones with higher%Rural survives the change fromBase scenario
to Federal I. It is interesting to note that the estimates for % Rural · IPoor (0.38) in the AC
specification also remain positive and significant. The federal Lifeline program reduces the cost
of extending service in a given state, but the average cost in rural areas remains high so a high
relative weight on the poor consumers of these areas is still required to rationalize prices. An-
other interesting result is that democrat regulators are assigned higher weights for low income
consumers with significant coefficients % Dem− PUC · IPoor (0.05) and % Dem− Leg · IPoor
(0.29). The W − test Weights rejects now the hypothesis of no systematic weight differences
across consumer groups. More informally, the Figure 4 shows how the weight differences for
MC are bigger in the Federal I specification.
The results for the Federal II specification in Table 7 are comparable to Federal I but the
magnitude of the bias changes. For specification MC, I observe estimates % Rural (−0.08),
% Poor (0.82), % Rural · IPoor (0.17) and % Poor · IPoor (−0.65). All theses coefficients are
significant with the exception of % Rural. It is noteworthy that the coefficient on % Rural ·
IPoor stays positive across all specifications pointing towards the robustness of the rural poor
bias. However, the size of % Rural is relatively small when compared with the effect of poor
population % Poor · IPoor and the rural bias is then not the main distortion in weights. The
differences in weights are large enough forW−test Weights to reject that there is no systematic
bias. Figure 5 provides a graphical representation of this argument.
Observation of the coefficients for % Poor and % Poor · IPoor in Federal I and Federal II
reveals that both specifications imply that the regulator is favoring the general population
(positive coefficient on% Poor) in areas with high percentage of poor population at the expense
(negative coefficient on % Poor · IPoor) of the low income population. This result might be due
to the preferences of the regulator but it is also possible that unobserved legal and political
constraints prevent state regulators from taking full advantage of the federal Lifeline program.
If this is the case, λ cannot be interpreted as pure welfare weights but just as an index of the
distortion away from total consumer surplus maximization.
The effects of political controls Elected·IPoor, % Dem−Leg ·IPoor and % Dem−PUC ·IPoor
turn bigger and more significant in the Federal II specification. The signs are as expected with
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the exception of % Dem−Leg · IPoor (−0.61). Given the lower speed of law making relative to
PUC decisions, % Dem−Leg · IPoor might not be directly connected with the configuration of
the PUC and it proxies for some state characteristic. More generally, political variables might
identify states with subsidies at the margin of the federal matching region described in Section
4.4, which have different marginal profit functions under Federal I and Federal II.
7 Policy Experiment
In this section, I examine the direct welfare effects of (i) the realignment of residential tele-
phone prices with costs and (ii) the elimination of federal subsidy programs and welfare weight
differences across consumers. The model in Section 4 allows me to calculate the adjustment
of residential demand, revenues and variable costs to these price changes. The simultaneous
control for demand and cost factors is important. For example, optimal prices for high cost
areas in a state do not necessarily match the full average cost in those areas if consumers there
also exhibit a relatively weak demand.
This study takes as exogenous the locations of state telephone networks and focuses on price
variations. A different research project would consider the suppression of some local networks to
eliminate all the associated avoidable costs. Political and legal restrictions make this downsizing
policy very difficult to implement. Additionally, the telephone network is already in place and
a portion of the fixed costs is sunk, making more important to examine the price choice that
maximizes welfare for this configuration.
The policy experiment only considers an adjustment of residential telephone prices rather
than the full price structure of telecommunication services in each state. These limited policy
options are close to the choice set of a state regulator that sees how competition limits its
influence outside the residential segment.21 This exercise is therefore relevant for regulators
with limited price power.
21The determination of wholesale prices is an alternative policy tool available to the regulator that is out of
the scope of the current exercise. See Rosston et al. (2008).
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 40 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1201
7.1 Cost Pricing Rules
I calculate the welfare changes associated to a realignment of prices with marginal and aver-
age costs. These are simple rules that do not require solving an optimization problem and I
present them first to set the structure of the counterfactual exercises. The current residential
prices generate a deficit and the realignment with cost implies a price increase and a demand
contraction, which brings both lower revenues and variable costs for the firm. The full set of
results is presented in Table 8.
Marginal cost pricing maximizes welfare for a given network of local markets so I observe
that the increase in the sum of welfare for of all the states ΔW = $16.25m is greater for
this policy versus ΔW = $10.5m for average cost pricing. Given that the sample comprises a
substantial portion of the local telephone market in the US (68m households), this represents a
small welfare distortion even if measured in annual terms: $195m and $126m for marginal and
average cost pricing.
The changes in consumer surplus and profits are significantly higher with Δπ = $717m
and ΔCS = −$700.5m for marginal cost policy and Δπ = $714m and ΔCS = −$703.6m
for average cost policy. All these results are driven by the low average elasticity of demand.
As prices increase from the current level, the consumers do not drop the service in significant
numbers. The higher tariffs then increase the return that the firm obtains from each household
of a network with an approximately constant size. The average reductions in penetration in a
[0, 1] scale are ΔPn = −0.026 and ΔPn = −0.027 for marginal and average cost pricing. The
decrease in expected penetration among low income households is substantially higher. For
example, ΔPn = −0.103 for the marginal cost pricing policy.
The small variation in total welfare seems to imply that the allocation problem associated to
the tariff choice is to be guided by equity considerations. However, the elimination of the deficit
can allow to reduce the distortions in other sectors of the economy (business local telephone
sector, long distance telephone sector, etc.) and lead to higher efficiency gains. It is not possible
for me to estimate these gains precisely with the current data set. Some basic calculations can
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be performed with an estimate of the social cost of local telephone deficit. With a public funds
multiplier of 1.3,22 the additional efficiency gain associated with the reduction of deficit is
$ 215m for marginal cost pricing and $ 214.2m for average cost pricing. The annual equivalents
of these amounts are significant and approximately equal to $ 2.6bn.
7.2 Alternative Regulators
I examine here the pricing policies that would be implemented by a regulator with no bias
across consumers and without the distortion of the federal subsidy program. This regulator
will set optimal Ramsey prices given a minimum profit requirement. If this profit restriction
is set equal to the current level of deficit from the residential telephone sector, the welfare
optimization problem corresponds to a regulator that tries to make use of the allowed deficit to
maximize unweighted total consumer surplus. If the profit requirement is set equal to the total
cost of residential service, the prices set by the regulator will implement the optimal deficit
reduction.
Optimal prices will still vary across the geographic zones as the demand and cost conditions
are different in these areas. I have described in Section 3 how different prices are set for each
actual price zone and that this geographic unit aggregates multiple local markets. I will keep
pricing at the zone level in Zone Regulator experiments and introduce pricing at the local
market level in Multi Market Regulator experiments. This will provide the additional benefit
of measuring the welfare impact of allowing for broad geographic price discrimination.
The elimination of the different consumer weights and the federal subsidy program while
maintaining a constant deficit leads to a decrease in prices for the general population that is
partly compensated by an increase in the prices for the low income group. The rationale of
this price adjustment is that a household with median income is not likely to drop the service
given a price increase and its expected consumer surplus decreases more than the corresponding
surplus of a low income household. In the scenario Zone Regulator I, I observe price variations
22Snow and Warren (1996) find this is as an average estimate of the cost of public funds for OECD countries.
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$13.3m, but the reduction of base rates at the expense of the low income consumers poses a
political challenge. The results in Multi Market Regulator I exhibit additional welfare gains
associated to the added pricing flexibility with ΔW = $ 15.8m. The full set of outcomes is in
panels (a) and (c) of Table 9.
The scenario in Zone Regulator II sets the profit requirement of the firm as high as to
cover the portion of costs allocated to residential service according to the following average cost
rule:
πs =
Zs
z=1
Nzs
j=1
acjz,HCPM ·Djzg
where acjz,HCPM corresponds to average cost per line in the HCPM model. The increase in
welfare ΔW = $13.8m for Zone Regulator II is greater than the result for the average cost
pricing rule in subsection 7.1. Prices are now adjusted optimally to the demand and cost
conditions at the price zone level. The scenario Multi Market Regulator II has an associated
welfare gain equal to ΔW = $ 16.1m, which is very close to the optimal solution of marginal
cost pricing. The portion of imputed total cost in excess of variable costs is moderate (a local
market average of $24, 000) so the welfare distortion imposed by the need to break even with
respect to marginal cost pricing is small. I also notice that there is only a moderate welfare
gain from pricing at the local market level rather than at the zone level as in Zone Regulator
scenarios.
8 Conclusion
This article shows with an empirical study of local residential telecommunication services how
structural econometric models can be used to recover regulators’s objectives. The analysis
requires only public market data and well-understood IV-GMM techniques as in BLP (1995).
The presented framework can then be useful for regulators and researchers without micro data
and limited resources.
Δ#p1n(m) = −$3.9 and Δ#p2n(m) = $17.5. This policy change improves efficiency, ΔW =
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of regulators’s weights across consumers with different incomes and locations. The analysis
shows no evidence of a bias in favor of the general population of rural areas but it offers some
support for the presence of a bias in favor of poor consumers in rural areas. The estimated
effect of the percentage of poor consumers of an area on the relative weights depends on the
estimated model. For the realistic assumption that state regulators do not internalize fully
the costs of federal low-income subsidies, I observe that low income consumers are disfavored
in poor areas. The negative relative bias on low income consumers is compensated in states
with a Democrat and direct election PUC by the higher state-wide average weight placed on
low income consumers. Under several plausible specifications, a joint test on weight differences
rejects the hypothesis that they are systematically equal to zero.
The confirmation of the existence of state regulator bias is important for the implementa-
tion of federal policies and it provides some justification for the federal subsidy programs if
these are oriented to correct biases in state policy. This information can be relevant for the
extension of universal service subsidy programs to wireless and broadband Internet services.
The importance of a proper structure of Broadband Universal Service will be increasing as In-
ternet and Internet telephony consolidate further. The experiments in the last section quantify
a small direct welfare effect of regulatory bias on local residential services, but an important re-
distribution between residential consumers and the firm. If the implementation of new subsidy
programs is decentralized to state regulators, we can expect the bias across consumers to lead
the implemented outcome away from the first best solution. To the extent that the demand for
wireless and new Internet services is as inelastic as the demand for local telephone in the past,
the direct welfare impacts can also be expected to be moderate. Whether this is effectively the
case is a question left for future research as better data on the broadband and wireless sector
become available.
The regulation model separates demand and cost factors precisely from actual differences
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A Appendix: Additional Data Description
The first part of the appendix contains the definitions of demographic variables and information
on the use of census data. The second part details the data on regulators’s characteristics,
competition and the price setting process.
A.1 Markets and Demographic Data
The data set is the result of matching the demographic information from the United States
Census (2000) to data on regulation policy at the local market level. This combination is made
possible by use of Claritas (2003), which contains a cross reference of census block groups,
CBGs henceforth, and wire centers. The CBG is the finest geographic level at which the US
Census 2000 is disclosed. The average size of a CBG is 1,500 persons.
Local market demographics formed from the United States Census (2000) include total
number of households, Total hhs, classification of total households by race groups, %Black hhs,
%Asian hhs, %Native hhs and % Other hhs (%White hhs is recovered by subtracting from one
the sum of the percentages for the other races), percentage of rural households, % Rural, per-
centage of poor households, % Poor hhs,Median hh income, in thousand dollars, and percentage
of households in a Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), % MSA. A MSA is a geographic en-
tity designated by the Census to represent core urban areas with population of at least 50,000
persons. I use this variable as a proxy for urban development and economic activity.
The United States Census (2000) allows me to construct total telephone penetration (per-
centage of total households with telephone), Tel Pen Total, and the distribution of income
at the local market level. I add this data to the original Ackerberg et al. (2008) data set
to characterize the demand conditions for the general population beyond the poor household
group analyzed in that article. Telephone penetration for poor households, Tel Pen Poor, is
constructed by allocating to CBGs penetration data at the Census Tract level of the US Census
2000. The Census Tract is a broader geographical unit than the CBG.
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A.2 Regulators’s Characteristics and Tariff Setting
State Regulation
The National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners provides in NARUC (2002)
data for each state public utility commission (PUC) in year 2000 on the percentage of democrat
commissioners, % Dem − PUC, and the formation mechanism (election versus appointment
of commissioners), Elected. This provides a basic political profile for each commission. The
percentage of Democrats in the state legislature, % Dem-Leg, is added as an additional political
control.
Competition in residential local telephone has remained moderate despite the TA 96, with
a national average of 2% of residential lines provided by CLECs in year 2000. Entry in local
telephone has focused on the business segment, which contains a higher number of sizeable high
value customers. The profit derived from the business segment contributes to break even by
ILECs and it provides slack to the regulator to maintain low residential revenues. The relative
size of the business and residential segments (measured as the rate of business to residential
lines in the state), Business/Residential Ratio, and the degree of competition (measured
with the percentage of lines provided by CLECs, percentage of residential lines provided by
CLECs and the early presence of local telephone competition in 1995), % CLEC lines in 1999,
% CLEC res. lines in1999 and Competition in 1995, are proxies for the slackness in the budget
constraint faced by the regulator.23
The data set contains not only the tariffs described in Section 3.1 but also the line counts
employed by the regulators in the tariff setting process. As described in Rosston and Wim-
mer (2005), state regulators commonly follow a value-of-service methodology to set prices by
which they firstly assign wire centers into geographic groups denominated as local calling areas
(LCAs), classify the LCAs into rate groups according to the number of lines and then set dif-
ferent prices for different rate groups. Some states follow alternative approaches and assign a
23I added to the dataset in Ackerberg et al. (2008) the variables % CLEC lines in 1999 and
% CLEC res lines in 1999 from the FCC Statistics of Common Carriers (1999) and Local Telephone Report
(1999). Observations for states with small presence of CLECs are missing due to confidentiality requirements.
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households in each LCA, LCA hhs, is used as a proxy for network value.
Federal Programs: Lifeline, Linkup and HCPM
In year 2000, the federal regulator provided a basic Lifeline subsidy equal to the federal
subscriber line charge (SLC) plus $ 1.75 for a total of $ 5.25 , for all states except District of
Columbia which had a lower SLC. The state regulators are free to provide additional support
and the federal administration is committed to providing 50 cents of additional support for each
dollar of state subsidy up to a cap.24 The federal Linkup program provides a discount equal to
the minimum of $ 30 and 50% of the regular price. State regulators are free to provide Linkup
support and there is no form of federal Linkup matching.
Estimates of the participation in Lifeline and Linkup are available at the state level. I
employ a filing of National Consumer Law Center (2001) to the FCC to obtain an estimate of
the ratio of participants to eligible consumers. This participation rate is cross checked with the
FCC monitoring report (1999).
The HCPM program compares the state average costs of non rural ILECs to the national
average in order to determine the subsidy funds available to a given state. For those states
exceeding 135% of the national average, the ILEC is eligible to high cost model support. The
subsidy at each wire center in that state will equal 76% of the difference between wire center
cost per line and the national average. If the subsidy exceeds a cap of state available funds,
it will be reduced proportionally in all wire centers. The states affected in the sample include
AL, KY, ME, MS and WV.
The hold-harmless provision would initially keep constant the total amount of support for
non rural ILECs excluded from the high cost model program. The FCC Thirteenth Report and
Order (2000) set up a phase down schedule of this interim program. The states in the sample
affected by hold-harmless provisions are AR, CO, KY, NM and SC, but they did not receive
this form of subsidy after year 2000. In year 2000, the hold-harmless contribution to state s was
single price across the state or allow prices to depend explicitly on costs. The number of million
24The cap on federal lifeline subsidy per line was $ 7 for year 2000. Given a basic federal subsidy of $ 5.25,
state regulators can anticipate additional federal funds for state subsidies below $ 3.5.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 47 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1201
subsequent year t would be given by:
HHCs(t) =

Zs
z=1
Nzs
j=1
ljz + ls

·max
⎛
⎝ HHCs$Zs
z=1
Nzs
j=1 ljz + ls
% − t, 0
⎞
⎠
where ljz and ls denote respectively the number of residential lines of the regulated firm in local
market jz and all other telephone lines in state s. The state s contains Zs price zones with Nzs
local markets in each price zone z. The term −t implies that the hold-harmless support per line
is reduced every year. I define Ts as the last year in which a state s receives a hold-harmless
contribution and assume that state regulators do not induce demand variations big enough to
alter this temporal threshold. The correction to marginal profit from a price increase ∂pz(m)
is then:
Ts
t=1
∂HHCs(t)
∂pz(m)
=
Ts
t=1
− rs
(1 + rs)
t · t ·
∂ljzg
∂pz(m)
where the term rs/ (1 + rs)
t converts the temporal effect of the hold-harmless provision into a
monthly perpetuity.
B Appendix: Mean Value Algorithm
I detail in this appendix the algorithm used to implement the contraction in (15). As presented
in Section 5.1, the algorithm initially applies the iteration step in (15) to all 6854 observations
and, as the number of iterations increase, it continues the application of the step in (15) only in
those markets that have not reached a solution. If the step in (15) was applied repeatedly to all
6854 observations, the time for the computation would increase prohibitively as local markets
with high telephone penetration require a high number of iterations. Less than 1% of the
sample exceeds a telephone penetration level higher than 0.999, but it would force thousands
of unnecesary iterations for the remaining 99% of the observations if this precaution is not
taken.25 I employ then the following procedure:
25For the available data, the typical demand specification in Section 6 and parameter values close to the truth,
700 iterations are required for convergence if sn ≤ 0.95. For 0.95 ≤ sn ≤ 0.99, this number climbs to 1750. For
fixed at a given level HHCs, but the phase down schedule entailed that the contribution in a
0.99 ≤ sn, this number exceeds 4500.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 48 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1201
Mean Value (δn) algorithm
For a total number of N local markets, define an appropriate norm .over differences26
δit+1T − δitT . Then,
Step 0: Set T = N , δ1T = !δ for pre-existing estimate !δ, define number of iterations
it_step = 100 and choose tolerance level tol = 1e−6.
Step 1: Apply step (15) for a number of iterations it_step.
Step 2: Check whether
			δit_stepT − δ
it_step−1
T
			 ≤ tol. If ”yes” stop the procedure. If
”no”, proceed to step 3.
Step 3: Save the value δit_stepTtol for local markets δ
it_step
Ttol
⊆ δit_stepT such that			δit_stepTtol − δ
it_step−1
Ttol
			 ≤ tol.
Step 4: Use δit_stepTno ⊆ δ
it_step
T such that
			δit_stepTno − δ
it_step−1
Tno
			 > tol to set δ1T = δ
it_step
Tno
and T = Tno. Increase the number of iterations to it_step = it_step+ 50. Revert to step 1.
There is also a time cost of selecting and saving observations that achieve their solution. I
have chosen to increase the number of iterations by 50 after each stop and obtain satisfactory
results. Computational procedures considered in Su and Judd (2008) and applied to BLP
demand estimation by Dube et al. (2008) might also improve the computation of mean value.
C Appendix: Joint estimation of cost and welfare weights
I adjust the cost and welfare weight specifications to obtain an estimate of marginal cost at the
zone level from the first order conditions in (9) and (10):
mc
jz
= γ · Costz + ωz + ωjz (22)
log (λz) = φ · Polz + ηz (23)
26The norm . is defined as the max
δit+1t − δitt
 across t ∈ {1, 2, ..., T}. The symbol δitT denotes the it vector
of (T × 1) mean values for T local markets.
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where all unobserved shocks (ωz, ωjz,ηz) are uncorrelated with cost and policy shifters. For
each zone z, I assume a common expected marginal cost E [mcjz | ιs] = mcz = γ · Costz + ωz
as in (22) and a common weight λz across the groups (λz1 = λz2 = λz) as in (23). This
specification assumes a regulator with a relatively coarse knowledge of its jurisdiction, as there
is no information of cost variation within a zone. It has the advantage of not requiring cost
data as marginal cost is inferred from first order conditions and it also allows for zone level
unobserved error ωz on the regulator’s expected marginal cost. I can then rewrite (9) and (10)
as:
λz
1 + μs
· ∂CSzp + ∂Rzp −mcz · ∂Dzp = 0 (24)
λz
1 + μs
· ∂CSzd + ∂Rzd −mcz · ∂Dzd = 0 (25)
where the following abbreviations have been employed:
∂Dzp =
Nzs
j=1
2
g=1
∂Djzg
∂pz(m)
∂Dzd =
Nzs
j=1
∂Djz2
∂dz(m)
∂Rzp =
Nzs
j=1
2
g=1
Djzg +
∂Djz1
∂pz(m)
· (#pzg(m) + #pzg(c) · rs)
∂Rzd =
Nzs
j=1
−Djz2 +
∂Djz2
∂dz(m)
· (#pz2(m) + #pz2(c) · rs)
∂CSzp =
Nzs
j=1
2
g=1
∂CSjzg(.)
∂pz(m)
∂CSzd =
Nzs
j=1
∂CSjz2(.)
∂dz(m)
I can rearrange the conditions in (24) and (25) to solve for mcz and λz/ (1 + μs). The
subtraction of (24) times ∂CSzd/∂CSzp from (25) yields mcz. Formally,
mcz =
∂Rzd − ∂CSzd∂CSzp · ∂Rzp
∂Dzd − ∂CSzd∂CSzp · ∂Dzp
(26)
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λz/(1 + μs) from the substitution of mcz into (24). After some simplifications, I derive:
λz
1 + μs
=
∂Rzd · ∂Dzp − ∂Rzp · ∂Dzd
∂CSzp · ∂Dzd − ∂CSzd · ∂Dzp (27)
It is possible to eliminate the Lagrangian multiplier μs by using differences of the expression
in (27) across consumer groups in different zones, as presented in Section 5. Alternatively, it
is possible to avoid the bias from the omission of μs by the inclusion of suitable state fixed
effects in the equation for welfare weights. The index over the set of all welfare weights is now
v ∈ {1, ..., V } with V =Ss=1 Zs (number of zones). For marginal cost observations, I use the
index q ∈ {1, ..., Q} where Q = Ss=1 Zs. The set of available welfare weights and costs are
collected as {λ1, ...,λV } and {mc1, ...,mcQ}. I then take the following marginal cost and weight
equations to the data:
mcq = γ · Costq + ωq (28)
log(λv)− log(1 + μs) =
S
s=2
φs · 1(s)v + φ · Pol_Sv + ηv (29)
where the observations for mc and λ are computed from (26) and (27). The motivation of the
use state fixed effects is the same as in Section 5.
Empirical Results
The empirical results for the specification in this appendix are presented in Table 10. The
policy controls Polv considered include the price zone averages of Total hhs (k), % Rural and
% Poor whereas I choose the price zone averages of Total hhs(k), household Density, % Rural
and % MSA for cost controls Costp.
The estimates of policy parameters φ include Total hhs(k) (0.0002), % Rural (−0.003),
and % Poor (−0.26) against the common wisdom of a bias in favor of poor and rural areas.
Only the variable % Poor and the constant are significant. A Wald test, W − test Weights,
on the estimated sum of squared weight differences χ
λ∗
cannot reject the hypothesis that there
is no systematic difference in weights given a statistic value of 1.77 for a χ
2
(1). The estimates
for the parameters in φ that affect the general population in Table 6 and Table 10 are in line.
Given mcz, it is immediate to derive ωz = mcz − γz ·Costz and it is also possible to obtain
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The lack of flexibility of the weights in the specification in this appendix does not affect these
estimates.
The estimates for cost parameters γ reveal that less rural areas are assigned a higher cost
given Rural (−0.24) and % MSA (1.84). Only the constant and % MSA terms are significant
in the cost regressions. The estimated marginal cost is too close to $ 0 and far from the HCPM
benchmark of $ 23 to be realistic. I attribute the unnatural cost estimate to misspecification
coming from the assignment of a single weight to each area rather than allowing a different
weight λz2 for the low income population. The current model assigns low costs rather than
high consumer bias in favor of poor rural consumers to rationalize the prices in those regions.
This illustrates the limitations in the use of optimality conditions for estimation with limited
cost information.
D Appendix: Variance Covariance Matrix
The variance covariance matrix !ΣΘ of the estimated parameters ΘˆD ≡ (!β, !α) and ΘˆS ≡ (!γ, !φ)
is obtained from the general GMM variance covariance formula:
!ΣΘ = (1/N)(ΓTΩΓ)−1ΓTΩΨΩΓ(ΓTΩΓ)−1
where Γ is the Jacobian of the derivatives of moment conditions with respect to parameters in
ΘD and ΘS. The term 1/N comes from the asymptotic scaling term
√
N applied to all the
moments in f in Section 5. The expression in Ψ corresponds to the variance covariance of
moments. Formally,
Γ = ⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
∂fW/∂ΘD 0
∂fCost/∂ΘD ∂fCost/∂Θs
∂fPol/∂ΘD ∂fPol/∂Θs
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
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Ψ = ⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1
N
S
s=1Φ
T
s Φs 0 0
0 N
Q
·Qq=1 (ωq · Costq)T (ωq · Costq) 0
0 0 N
V
V
v=1 (ηv · Polv)T (ηv · Polv)
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
The block diagonal structure of Ψ follows from the assumption of no correlation between
demand, cost and policy moments. Formally, I assume that the following condition holds
E

CostT · ω · ξ ·W  = E PolT · η · ξ ·W  = E PolT · η · ω · Cost = 0 (and the same zero
covariance condition for the antisymmetric elements in Ψ).27 The expression Φs =
N(s)
n=1 ξn ·
Wn for n in state s allows for clustering of arbitrary form at the state level for the demand
unobserved component ξ.
In Section 5.2, I introduced in equation (18) the ratios of welfare weights λ∗ for different
consumer groups in a state s. The set of available weight differences is

λ∗1, ...,λ
∗
V−S

, where
S equals the number of states, as one weight in each state must be used as base to form the
differences. The variance of a particular difference in weights !σ2λ∗ can be obtained from !ΣΘ by
a simple application of the delta method because weight differences are a function of ΘD and
ΘS. If I define the Jacobian of a weight difference λ
∗ with respect to the parameters of the
model as Γλ∗ = ∂λ
∗/∂Θ, it is possible to derive that:
!σ2λ∗ = Γλ∗ · !ΣΘ · ΓTλ∗
The same method can be applied to any function of

λ∗1, ...,λ
∗
V−S

to form suitable variances
and Chi-2 tests. I exploit this possibility to test the hypothesis that the sum of the squared
weight differences is equal to zero. The test statistic is given by:
χ
λ∗
= (λ∗1)
2 + ...+

λ∗V−S
2
If this test rejects χ
λ∗
= 0, it provides evidence of systematic bias across different consumers.
27A sufficient condition for this covariance structure to hold is the absence of correlation between unobserved
shocks given exogenous variables, e. g., E [ξ · ω| W,Cost] = 0.
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E Appendix: Analysis of Instrumental Variables
In this section, I present the analysis of the strength of the set of instruments employed in
Section 5 and the endogeneity of monthly and connection prices. The statistics were obtained
with the ivreg2 Stata module developed by Baum et al. (2007). Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002)
provide a general guide into the weak instruments literature.
The results in column (a) of Table 11 correspond to the to the IV ∗ specification for
All households in Table 3. It seems that the proposed set of instruments is strong forMonthly_50
with high Shea’s Partial R2 (0.47) and F statistic (33.16), but it is not fully satisfactory for
Subsidy_50 with an F statistic below the threshold value of 10 accepted as a rule of thumb in
the weak instruments literature from results in Staiger and Stock (1997). The use of cluster-
robust standard errors blurs the meaning of this comparison as the standard test results are
developed for the case of i.i.d. errors.28 Given this uncertainty about the strength of the instru-
ments, I perform tests robust to the presence of weak instruments for the joint significance of
Monthly_50 and Subsidy_50. The Anderson-Rubin Wald test and Stock-Wright LM statistic
reject the hypothesis of no joint significance of the coefficients on the monthly charges.
The column (b) in Table 11 considers an alternative specification with Connection and Sub-
sidy_Connection as additional endogenous variables. The robust endogeneity test for individual
variables in Section 5 of Baum et al. (2007) rejects the hypothesis of exogenous Monthly_50
and Subsidy_50 given a value of the statistic (5.99). An analogous test of the joint endogeneity
of all the price variables also rejects exogeneity (8.24). A test of endogeneity of Connection and
Subsidy_Connection given endogenous Monthly_50 and Subsidy_50 fails to reject exogene-
ity (5.42). I have thus no evidence in favor of endogenous connection charges. However, weak
instruments can affect the power of the endogeneity test and the proposed set of instruments is
weak for these new variables with partial R2 values (0.076) and (0.084) and low F statistic val-
28Stock and Yogo (2001) develop a rigorous test for the presence of weak instruments but it also excludes the
presence of clustering in the errors. The comparison of suitable Kleibergen-Paap statistics to critical values of
Yogo and Stock is not easily interpretable.
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but the Stock-Wright LM statistic does not reject in this specification.
The bottom part of Table 11 reproduces the analysis for the poor population and it obtains
analogous results with evidence in favor of the endogeneity of the monthly fee of low income
households Monthly_50(sub) and strength of the instruments used for this variable. I do not
repeat the analysis for the top part of the table and the reader is referred directly to Table 11.
ues. The robust Anderson-Rubin Wald test rejects again the hypothesis of no joint significance
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
All Wire Centers Wire Centers <100%
N 7118 6854
(a) Mean Sd Mean Sd
Tel Pen Total 0.971 0.030 0.970 0.030
Tel Pen Poor 0.923 0.063 0.920 0.063
Total hhs 9646 12140 9944 12268
% Black hhs 0.097 0.172 0.100 0.175
% Asian hhs 0.016 0.036 0.016 0.036
% Native hhs 0.008 0.033 0.008 0.033
% Other hhs 0.041 0.068 0.041 0.068
% Rural 0.397 0.408 0.391 0.407
% MSA 0.630 0.479 0.626 0.480
% Poor hhs 0.123 0.079 0.125 0.078
Median hh income (k) 43.664 17.246 42.998 16.588
(b) Mean Sd Mean Sd
% Dem-Leg 0.541 0.130 0.540 0.128
% Dem-PUC 0.347 0.271 0.348 27.325
Elected 0.168 0.374 0.174 0.379
Business/Residential Ratio 0.577 0.141 0.575 0.142
Competition in 1995 0.155 0.362 0.154 0.361
% CLEC lines in 1999 0.044 0.019 0.042 0.016
% CLEC res. lines in 1999 0.021 0.020 0.020 0.020
Monthly_0 11.176 2.315 11.167 2.307
Monthly_50 13.588 2.495 13.575 2.480
Monthly_100 15.815 2.747 15.781 2.717
Monthly_200 16.839 3.225 16.802 3.217
Monthly_0(sub) 3.203 2.048 3.218 2.048
Monthly_50(sub) 5.066 2.433 5.071 2.443
Monthly_100(sub) 7.277 3.077 7.257 3.081
Monthly_200(sub) 8.498 4.125 8.485 4.139
Connection 36.163 11.336 36.103 11.311
Connection (sub) 12.465 7.532 12.506 7.553
LCA hhs 228450 420021 230782 424999
(c) Mean Sd Mean Sd
Average cost per line 38.060 27.627 37.872 27.424
Note. In panel (b), variables from % Dem− Leg to % CLEC res.
lines in 1999 are reported at the state level. The variables %CLEC
res.lines in 1999 and % CLEC lines in 1999 miss observations for
AZ, AR, ID, IA KS, KY, ME, NE, NV, NJ, NM, ND, OK, RI, SC, SD,
WV.
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Table 2: Summary of Key Notation
Symbol Description
T Transpose of a vector or matrix
Model
z ∈ {1, ..., Zs} Index over price zones in state s
j ∈ {1, ..., Nzs} Index over local markets in zone z and state s
g ∈ {1, 2} Index over income groups g = 1 and g = 2
Pjz Probability of adoption of local telephone in market jz
xjz Exogenous demand conditions in market jz
Mjz Number of households in market jz
#pzg(m), pz(m) Net and Gross monthly prices for a group g in zone z
#pzg(c), pz(c) Net and Gross connection fee for a group g in zone z
dz(m) Subsidy to monthly prices in zone z
dz(c) Subsidy to connection charge in zone z
α ≡ [αi(m),αi(c)] Marginal utility of change in #pzi(m) and #pzi(c) for a house i
ijz Idiosyncratic shock for house i in market jz
ξjz Unobserved mean value in market jz
δjz Total mean value in market jz
ΘD ≡ [α, β] Demand parameters include α and coefficients on xjz
Fjzg Joint distribution of income and  for group g in market jz
Djzg Demand from group g in market jz
CSjzg Consumer surplus for group g in market jz
πjzg Profit from group g in market jz
λzg Regulatory weight on group g in zone z
Polzg Policy shifters on the weight of group g in zone z
ηzg Unobserved policy shock on weight of group g in zone z
mcjz Marginal cost in market jz
Kjz Fixed cost in market jz
Costjz Vector of cost shifters in market jz
TCjz Total cost in market jz
wjz Unobserved cost shock in in market jz
L(.) Lifeline state subsidy cost function
HCSjzg High Cost Subsidy originated by group g in market jz
Θs ≡ [γ,φ] Supply parameters include coefficients on Costjz and Polzg
rs Discount rate of the telephone operator in state s
Bs Profit requirement for the regulator in state s
μs Lagrange Multiplier for profit constraint in state s
Ws Welfare function in state s
Estimation
n ∈ {1, ..., N} Index over all local markets observations in sample
q ∈ {1, ..., Q} Index over all cost observations in sample
v ∈ {1, ..., V } Index over all policy weight observations in sample
sn Actual telephone penetration in local market observation n
1(s)v Indicator for weight observation v belonging to state s
Pol_Sv All variables in Polv excluding indicator 1(s)v
Ipoor,v Indicator for weight observation v belonging to g = 2
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Table 3: Logit Demand Estimation (with homogeneous households)
All households (N=6854)
OLS IV*
β Sd(β) β Sd(β)
Constant 2.58 0.354∗∗∗ 3.001 0.404∗∗∗
Monthly_50 -0.016 0.024 -0.077 0.025∗∗∗
Subsidy_50 0.022 0.024 0.061 0.049
Connection -0.008 0.007 -0.004 0.007
Subsidy_Connection 0.013 0.008 0.013 0.006∗∗
% Black hhs -1.470 0.153∗∗∗ -1.515 0.171∗∗∗
% Asian hhs 0.661 0.461 0.122 0.539
% Native hhs -2.306 0.496∗∗∗ -1.956 0.413∗∗∗
% Other hhs -2.448 0.749∗∗∗ -2.806 0.704∗∗∗
LCA hhs 0.078 0.068 0.097 0.074
% Rural -0.358 0.052∗∗∗ -0.369 0.054∗∗∗
Median hh income 0.037 0.002∗∗∗ 0.036 0.002∗∗∗
% MSA 0.248 0.051∗∗∗ 0.241 0.054∗∗∗
Elasticity: Monthly_50 0.004 0.001∗∗∗ 0.016 0.001∗∗∗
R2 0.662 0.652
Hansen J-Stat 9.901(8)
Poor households (N=6374)
OLS IV*
β Sd(β) β Sd(β)
Constant 2.225 0.273∗∗∗ 2.398 0.243∗∗∗
Monthly_50 (sub) -0.020 0.018 -0.058 0.023∗∗∗
Connection (sub) -0.007 0.007 -0.007 0.006
% Black hhs -1.026 0.145∗∗∗ -1.061 0.154∗∗∗
% Asian hhs 2.504 0.618∗∗∗ 2.258 0.666∗∗∗
% Native hhs -1.928 0.495∗∗∗ -1.668 0.426∗∗∗
% Other hhs -1.592 0.667∗∗ -1.822 0.638∗∗∗
LCA hhs 0.177 0.048∗∗∗ 0.194 0.044∗∗∗
% Rural -0.344 0.064∗∗∗ -0.352 0.063∗∗∗
Median hh income 0.018 0.003∗∗∗ 0.017 0.002∗∗∗
% MSA 0.175 0.053∗∗∗ 0.173 0.054∗∗∗
Elasticity: Monthly_50 (sub) 0.007 0.001∗∗∗ 0.024 0.001∗∗∗
R2 0.375 0.365
Hansen J-Stat 7.703(9)
Note. The dependent variable is ln(sn)− ln(1− sn), where sn is the
telephone penetration for All households (upper panel) or Poor house-
holds (lower panel).
∗,∗∗,∗∗∗; significant at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels.
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Table 4: Logit Demand Estimation (with individual heterogeneity)
N 6854
(a) (b)
f 188.34 207.67
β Sd(β) β Sd(β)
Constant 3.170 0.286∗∗∗ 3.189 0.335∗∗∗
% Black hhs -1.377 0.174∗∗∗ -1.314 0.173∗∗∗
% Asian hhs 0.595 0.526 0.459 0.513
% Native hhs -1.925 0.362∗∗∗ -2.293 0.532∗∗∗
% Other hhs -2.909 0.813∗∗∗ -3.025 0.798∗∗∗
LCA hhs 0.150 0.045∗∗∗ 0.149 0.074∗∗
% Rural -0.376 0.063∗∗∗ -0.400 0.064∗∗∗
% MSA 0.227 0.055∗∗∗ 0.213 0.053∗∗∗
Median hh income 0.032 0.003∗∗∗ 0.032 0.004∗∗∗
α Sd(α) α Sd(α)
#pin(m) -0.382 0.150∗∗ -0.322 0.092∗∗∗
#pin(c) -0.068 0.052 0.020 0.030
εpin(m) Sd(εpin(m)) εpin(m) Sd(εpin(m))
All hhs 0.017 0.012∗ 0.016 0.007∗∗
Low Income hhs 0.055 0.032∗ 0.054 0.027∗∗
Normal Income hhs 0.002 0.001∗ 0.001 0.0006∗∗
Wald_elas 2.819(1)
∗ 4.077 (1)∗∗
Note. GMM estimates with moments E[(δ(α, .)− xβ)W ]. Wald_elas is a κ2
test for the difference between the elasticity of Low Income hhs and Normal
Income hhs.
∗,∗∗,∗∗∗; significant at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels.
Table 5: Marginal Cost Estimation with HCPM data
Q 7118
(a) (b) (c)
γ Sd(γ) γ Sd(γ) γ Sd(γ)
Constant 74238 1092∗∗∗ 58089 1010∗∗∗ 57951 1094∗∗∗
Res Lines 23.021 0.085∗∗∗ 21.810 0.073∗∗∗ 21.038 0.113∗∗∗
Bus Lines 14.919 0.177∗∗∗ 14.671 0.148∗∗∗ 13.998 0.236∗∗∗
Sa Lines 10.108 0.184∗∗∗ 10.923 0.150∗∗∗ 14.007 0.276∗∗∗
Area 87.026 4.847∗∗∗ 87.483 4.824∗∗∗
Area·Res Lines 0.013 0.001∗∗∗ 0.016 0.001∗∗∗
Area·Bus Lines 0.041 0.003∗∗∗ 0.037 0.003∗∗∗
Area·Sa Lines -0.028 0.002∗∗∗ -0.033 0.002∗∗∗
Res Lines·Bus Lines 10−5·4 10−5∗∗∗
Res Lines·Sa Lines -10−5·4 10−5∗∗∗
Bus Lines·Sa Lines -10−5·3 10−5∗∗∗
R2 0.9829 0.9900 0.9903
MC Res Lines
Average 23.218 22.866
Standard deviation 2.127 2.641
Minimum 21.810 18.516
Maximum 63.726 73.390
Note. The dependent variable is TCHCPM , the HCPM total cost in a wire center.∗,∗∗,∗∗∗; significant at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels.
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Table 6: Estimation of Regulator’s Welfare Weights
N,V 6854,312
Base Scenario
AC MC
φ Sd(φ) φ Sd(φ)
Constant -0.0028 0.0194 0.0137 0.0138
Total hhs (k) 0.0012 0.0009 0.0002 0.0004
% Rural 0.0525 0.0258∗∗ 0.0028 0.0096
% Poor -0.1576 0.1064 -0.1805 0.0855∗∗
IPoor -0.0516 0.0574 0.0097 0.0301
Elected ·IPoor 0.0563 0.0518 0.0201 0.0241
% Dem-Leg ·IPoor -0.1042 0.1204 -0.0074 0.0566
% Dem-PUC ·IPoor 0.0399 0.0373 0.0178 0.0160
Total hhs (k)·IPoor -0.0010 0.0017 -0.0005 0.0009
% Rural ·IPoor 0.2882 0.1012∗∗∗ 0.0416 0.0303
% Poor ·IPoor 1.2206 0.3851∗∗∗ 0.7895 0.2701∗∗∗
R2 0.721 0.857
W-test Weights 2.334(1) 1.5837 (1)
Federal I
AC MC
φ Sd(φ) φ Sd(φ)
Constant -0.0302 0.0228 -0.0086 0.0159
Total hhs (k) 0.0003 0.0011 -0.0010 0.0005∗∗
% Rural 0.0503 0.0371 -0.0117 0.0132
% Poor 0.8705 0.1237∗∗∗ 0.8792 0.0848∗∗∗
IPoor -0.5273 0.0700∗∗∗ -0.4873 0.0432∗∗∗
Elected ·IPoor 0.0684 0.0646 0.0166 0.0237
% Dem-Leg ·IPoor 0.1261 0.1699 0.2931 0.0811∗∗∗
% Dem-PUC ·IPoor 0.0631 0.0502 0.0492 0.0218∗∗
Total hhs (k)·IPoor -0.0003 0.0023 0.0009 0.0010
% Rural ·IPoor 0.3784 0.1458∗∗∗ 0.0639 0.0350∗
% Poor ·IPoor -0.0170 0.4694 -0.5135 0.3211
R2 0.7768 0.9495
W-test Weights 28.1269 (1) ∗∗∗ 10.2457(1)∗∗∗
Note. The dependent variable is ln(λ/1 + μ), the scaled welfare weight
in (17). The AC and MC panels use respectively HCPM average
cost and estimated marginal cost to recover weights in (17).
∗,∗∗,∗∗∗; significant at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels.
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Table 7: Estimation of Regulator’s Welfare Weights(contd.)
N,V 6854,312
Federal II
AC MC
φ Sd(φ) φ Sd(φ)
Constant -0.0373 0.0403 -0.0097 0.0395
Total hhs (k) -0.0005 0.0015 -0.0019 0.0015
% Rural -0.0168 0.0482 -0.0809 0.0473
% Poor 0.7991 0.1530∗∗∗ 0.8217 0.1495∗∗∗
IPoor -0.0893 0.0753 -0.0438 0.0571
Elected ·IPoor 0.1943 0.0591∗∗∗ 0.1485 0.0371∗∗∗
% Dem-Leg ·IPoor -0.7131 0.1427∗∗∗ -0.6113 0.0990∗∗∗
% Dem-PUC ·IPoor 0.4222 0.0463∗∗∗ 0.4293 0.0341∗∗∗
Total hhs (k)·IPoor 0.0017 0.0025 0.0028 0.0018
% Rural ·IPoor 0.4494 0.1329∗∗∗ 0.1740 0.0533∗∗∗
% Poor ·IPoor -0.2371 0.4701 -0.6481 0.3457∗
R2 0.6616 0.6817
W-test Weights 43.3011(1)∗∗∗ 17.1286(1)∗∗∗
Note. The dependent variable is ln(λ/1 + μ), the scaled welfare weight
in (17). The AC and MC panels use respectively HCPM average
cost and estimated marginal cost to recover weights in (17).
∗,∗∗,∗∗∗; significant at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels.
Table 8: Cost Oriented Pricing Rules
(a) Average Cost Pricing
Total (m dollars) Average (dollars)
ΔCS -703.5905 -102,654
Δπ 714.1037 104,188
ΔW 10.5132 1,534
Δ#p1n(m) 9.5393
Δ#p2n(m) 17.9658
ΔPn -0.0266
ΔPn (low income) -0.1058
(b) Marginal Cost Pricing
Total (m dollars) Average (in dollars)
ΔCS -700.4983 -102,203
Δπ 716.740 104,572
ΔW 16.2473 2,370
Δ#p1n(m) 9.269
Δ#p2n(m) 17.851
ΔPn -0.0256
ΔPn (low income) -0.1036
Note. Results in Average column are measured in dollars except ΔPn,
change in penetration, which is measured in the [0, 1] scale.
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Table 9: Optimal Pricing Rules
(a) Zone Regulator-I
Total (m dollars) Average (dollars)
ΔCS 13.2873 1,939
Δπ . .
ΔW 13.2873 1,939
Δ#p1n(m) -3.9018
Δ#p2n(m) 17.512
ΔPn -0.0217
ΔPn (low income) -0.1255
(b) Zone Regulator-II
Total (m dollars) Average (dollars)
ΔCS -869.77 -126,899
Δπ 883.58 128,914
ΔW 13.8052 2,014
Δ#p1n(m) 9.343
Δ#p2n(m) 17.872
ΔPn -0.0296
ΔPn (low income) -0.1278
(c) Multi Market Regulator -I
Total (m dollars) Average (dollars)
ΔCS 15.8127 2,307
Δπ . .
ΔW 15.8127 2,307
Δ#p1n(m) -3.0151
Δ#p2n(m) 17.1840
ΔPn -0.0244
ΔPn (low income) -0.1023
(d) Multi Market Regulator -II
Total (m dollars) Average (dollars)
ΔCS -867.473 -126,563
Δπ 883.58 128,914
ΔW 16.1089 2,350
Δ#p1n(m) 12.1750
Δ#p2n(m) 17.9558
ΔPn -0.0260
ΔPn (low income) -0.1040
Note. Results in Average column are measured in dollars except ΔPn,
change in penetration, which is measured in the [0, 1] scale.
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Table 10: Estimation of Regulator’s Welfare Weights and mc
N,Q,V 6854,156,156
φ Sd(φ)
Constant 0.0109 0.0039∗∗∗
Total hhs (k) 0.0002 0.0002
% Rural -0.0033 0.0051
% Poor -0.2580 0.1115∗∗
γ Sd(γ)
Constant 1.7689 0.9491∗
Total hhs (k) -0.0458 0.0485
Density -0.0004 0.0003
% Rural -0.2428 1.2194
% MSA 1.8356 0.7404∗∗
R2 Weights 0.7210
R2 Cost Correction 0.0589
W-test Weights 1.7713(1)
Note. The dependent variable for the welfare weight equation
is the scaled term ln(λ/1 + μ) in (27) and, for the marginal cost
equation, the term mc in (26).
∗,∗∗,∗∗∗; significant at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 71 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1201
Table 11: Instrument Analysis
All Households
(a) (b)
Shea’s Partial R2
Monthly_50 0.471 0.2531
Subsidy_50 0.327 0.2401
Connection 0.0765
Subsidy_Connection 0.0842
F-Stat df = (10,43)
Monthly_50 33.16∗∗∗ 24.96∗∗∗
Subsidy_50 6.58∗∗∗ 5.42∗∗∗
Connection 2.40∗∗
Subsidy_Connection 2.17∗∗
WI Robust Significance Test df = (10)
Anderson-Rubin Wald test 33.99∗∗∗ 43.94∗∗∗
Stock-Wright LM statistic 26.90∗∗∗ 23.58∗∗∗
Endogeneity df = (2) df = (4), (11)
Ho: All Exogenous 5.99∗∗ 8.24∗
Ho: Monthly Endogenous 5.42
Poor Households
(c) (d)
Shea’s Partial R2
Monthly_50 (sub) 0.396 0.294
Connection (sub) 0.094
F-Stat df = (10,43)
Monthly_50 (sub) 13.07∗∗∗ 10.85∗∗∗
Connection (sub) 1.63
WI Robust Significance Test df = (10)
Anderson-Rubin Wald test 41.03∗∗∗ 52.91∗∗∗
Stock-Wright LM statistic 23.15∗∗ 23.83∗∗∗
Endogeneity df = (1) df = (2, 11)
Ho: All Exogenous 4.582∗∗ 5.349∗
Ho: Monthly Endogenous 4.758
Note. ∗,∗∗,∗∗∗; significant at 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels.
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Figure 3: Base Case Differences in Consumer Weights (Logs)
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